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ATLAS OF MIGRATION

2025

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* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

** This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. Wherever not otherwise specified, the 2020 composition of the European Union is considered.

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The grouping of non-EU countries and territories by continent is based on geographical criteria only and does not have any political implications. For this exercise, we have followed the ESTAT GEO (Geopolitical entities reporting) code list which provides geographical entities for statistical purposes at the aggregate-level of countries, regions and organisations.

PREFACE

Bernard Magenhann
Director-General, Joint Research Center

Migration remains one of the most pressing and complex phenomena shaping our world, and an important policy priority for the European Union. In line with the EU's newly adopted Pact on Migration and Asylum, the European Commission launched the first Annual Migration Management Cycle in November 2025.

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) reaffirms its commitment to providing robust scientific evidence and accurate and context-sensitive data to support EU policies and global efforts in navigating the challenges and opportunities of migration.

The *Atlas of Migration 2025* guides policymakers by offering a comprehensive, data-driven analysis of migratory movements across the 27 EU Member States and 171 countries and territories worldwide. This year's edition deepens its exploration of the intricate linkages between conflicts and displacement — a topic of urgent relevance given the many humanitarian crises and forced displacement driven by violence and systemic instability. The third chapter of this year's Atlas provides an examination of the drivers of conflict-induced displacement, shedding some light on trajectories of mobility and immobility, as well as the decisions, constraints and data behind them.

This thematic chapter underscores the limitations of populistic narratives or the assumption that conflict automatically triggers displacement. Instead, it highlights the interplay of structural, economic and social factors, as well as the agency of individuals in navigating coercive environments. The analysis goes beyond simplistic or deterministic views, highlighting those decisions to migrate result from a combination of material constraints and personal aspirations.

At the JRC, we strive to ensure that the Atlas not only documents reality but also informs policy solutions and responses that are both effective and evidence based. I believe the insights and data it contains will help foster understanding, stimulate dialogue and guide EU policymaking on migration.

INTRODUCTION

By making global migration data easy to understand, the Atlas of Migration guides policymakers, researchers and the public through the complexities of international migration. The Atlas collates information from many official sources, including Eurostat, UN agencies, the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation. It illustrates the latest migration-related data by country, continent and sub-continental region, with a particular focus on the European Union (EU).

The first two sections of the Atlas provide a collection of two-page country profiles for the EU Member States and the non-EU countries and territories respectively. A 'how-to-read' note at the beginning of each section describes the content of the profiles and explains how to read each data visualisation. All profiles share a consistent structure, starting with demographic information, indicators of regular migration - including international protection -, and irregular migration. The structure slightly differs in the second page where EU Member State profiles provide an overview of the integration of third country nationals, whereas key contextual indicators on migration – political, socio-economic, and occupational – are explored for non-EU countries and territories.

The third and last section explores a different thematic every year. This edition of the Atlas focuses on conflict-related displacement, providing a comparative analysis of its drivers, dynamics and policy implications.

All indicators shown in the Atlas are relative to 2024 or latest available year. Most of the data visualisation shows past trend, at least for the last for year. This introduction highlights key migration flows and trends for 2024 and the first part of 2025.

The estimated number of international migrants worldwide at mid-2024 was 304 million[1]. This figure has grown steadily since the beginning of the century, at more than a double pace (+75%) with respect to that of the world population (+34%)[2]. The EU Member States host about 21% of the total number of international migrants in the world (63 million). At the same time, 10% of the global migrant population come from the 27 EU Member States.

In the last twenty years, the global number of refugees – which has been stable over the previous twenty years – has almost tripled. There were 15.3 million refugees at mid-2012 and more than 42.5 million as of mid-2025[3].

About 18% of these refugees are in the EU: 7.7 million including the approximately 4.4 million people displaced from Ukraine. About 22% are displaced in Africa (9.2 million) and twice as many people are displaced in Asia (about 15 million). Yet, in the last five years, the EU saw the highest relative increase in the number of refugees, with +200% against +54% in America and about +30% in Africa and Asia.

The number of new residence permits issued by the EU Member States in 2024 has decreased (3.5 million respect to 3.8 million in 2023) , interrupting a continuous growth that had lasted for more than ten years and which had only stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic[4]. About 60% of the new residence permits were issued in 2024 were for work- (32%) and family- (27%) related reasons.

In 2024, Spain, Germany and Poland together issued nearly half (1.6 million) of the first residence permits to non-EU citizens in the EU (3.5 million). In relative terms, Malta and Cyprus issued the highest number of new permits with 52 and 42 new permits per thousand inhabitants respectively; against an EU average of eight.

At the end of 2024, there were about 26.6 million valid residence permits in the 27 EU Member States (considering permits of all durations), together with 12.7 million long-term permits in

1 UNDESA - International Migrant Stock 2024
2 UNDESA – 2024 Revision of World Population Prospect
3 UNHCR – Refugee page and Refugee Statistics. Data includes refugees under UNHCR and UNRWA mandate as well as 'other people in need of international protection'.
4 Eurostat - First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (migr_resfirst)

course of validity. The overall number of valid permits has grown by about one million every year over the last four years, while the number of long-term permits has remained the same as in 2024[5].

After a sharp drop in the number of visa applications in the EU in 2020 and 2021, the number of applications picked up again in 2022 (7.4 million applications), in 2023 (9.9 million) and in 2024 (11 million).
However, these numbers remain significantly below the pre-pandemic record number of 16.6 million applications in 2019. The top three nationalities for number of visas issued in 2024 were China (1.7 million, doubled in the last year), Türkiye (960 thousand) and India (640 thousand)[6].

2024 saw a decrease in the number of first asylum applications in the EU (-13%) from more than one million in 2023 to 913 thousand. The decreasing trend is expected in 2025 too, as the sum of the applications submitted in the first eight months of 2025 (448 thousand) is much lower than that for the same period of 2024 (614 thousand).
Seven nationalities account for almost half of the total applications made in the EU Member States during the first eight months of 2025 and none of these is African: Venezuela 13%, Afghanistan 9%, Syria 6%, Bangladesh 5%, Türkiye 4%, Ukraine 4%, and Colombia 3%[7].

As Russia's war on Ukraine persists, people who fled the war to the EU continue to benefit from Temporary Protection. As of September 2025, nearly 4.3 million beneficiaries resided in the EU (about 100 thousand more than in September 2024), mainly in Germany (28%) and Poland (23%)[8].

In 2024, 453 thousand non-EU citizens were ordered to leave an EU Member State and about 110 thousand were returned to their country or to a third country[9]. Although the first figure was slightly lower than in the previous year and the second one slightly higher, the return rate – which is calculated as their ratio – remains low (about 24%). The number of orders to leave and the number of third country nationals returned to their country dropped by 16% and 7% respectively between the first three quarters of 2024 and the same period of 2025.

More granular and detailed data and trends can be found in the three sections of the Atlas.
We also suggest the following readings by international organizations: 'The European Annual Asylum and Migration Report 2025' COM(2025)795 adopted by the European Commission on 11 November 2025; ESTAT Migration and Asylum Overview; the OECD International Migration Outlook 2025; the IOM Global Appeal 2025; the UNDESA International Migrant Stock 2024; the IOM World Migration Report 2024; ESTAT Migration and asylum in Europe – 2024 edition.

5 Eurostat - All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year (migr_resvalid) & Long-term residents by citizenship on 31 December of each year (migr_reslong)
6 European Commission, DG for Migration and Home Affairs – Statistics on short-stay visas
7 Eurostat - Asylum applicants by type of applicant, citizenship, age and sex - monthly data (migr_asyappctzm)
8 Eurostat - Beneficiaries of temporary protection at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data (migr_asytpsm)
9 Eurostat - Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (migr_eiord) & Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (migr_eirtn)

MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

HOW TO READ

This section provides a two-page migration profile for each of the 27 EU Member States (MSs) and the EU.
Charts are organised in thematic parts. More detailed information is available in the Technical Notes at the end of this section.

Data refers to 2024. Whenever 2024 data is not available from the original source, latest available values are provided. If there is no data the corresponding field is either missing or indicated as 'N/A'.

Note that in some cases, the sum of percentages or of individual values might not add up to 100 or to the total value. This is due to rounding and confidence intervals applied by the source.

OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population - 2024 (in thousands)
The donut chart shows the number of people residing in the MS by broad group of citizenship. The groups are 'nationals', 'EU mobile', 'non-EU' (which includes also 'Stateless' and 'Unknown'). The total population of the country is in the centre.

Annual flows - 2023 (in thousands)
The two bar charts show the scale of migration to and from the MS. The left bar shows the number of people who have immigrated to the MS over the last year. 'within EU' immigration refers to people who are citizens of other EU MSs. 'outside EU' immigration refers to non-EU citizens.
The right bar shows the number of people who have emigrated from the MS over the last year, moving to another MS ('within EU') or to a non-EU country/territory ('outside EU'). The total numbers of immigrants and emigrants are on the top of each respective bar

ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications
The chart shows the number of people who have made a first application for asylum in the MS during a year. The data covers the last years and is broken down by sex. The total annual figure is shown on the right.

First instance decisions
The chart shows the distribution of decisions on first asylum applications in the MS by outcome: 'Geneva' for 'Geneva convention status'; 'Subsid.' for 'Subsidiary protection'; 'Human.' for 'Humanitarian protection'; and 'Reject.' for 'Rejected application'. The total number of decisions on first applications for asylum during a year is shown on the right.

NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Foreign citizens who have acquired citizenship during the year
Each of the pie charts, together with the relative number on the bottom, shows how many people from other countries and territories have acquired the citizenship of the MS per year. The data is broken down into (a) people whose previous citizenship was of another MS ('EU mobile') and (b) people whose previous citizenship was of a 'non-EU' country/territory (including both 'Stateless' and Unknown').

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population pyramid - 2024 (in thousand)
The chart shows the demographic composition of the population in the MS. It indicates the number of people by age group, sex (males and females) and broad group of citizenship (shown from the outside to the inside of the pyramid), specifically 'nationals' (citizens of the MS), 'EU mobile' (citizens of the other 26 MSs) and 'non-EU' citizens (which includes also 'Stateless' and 'Unknown'). The original Eurostat data is organised in five-year cohorts and has been aggregated to obtain ten-year cohorts. The data refers to the population as of 1st January.

SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)
Each donut chart shows the percentage of Schengen visas issued and not issued per year. The number in the centre shows the total number of visas applied for during each year.
The figure refers to the sum of uniform visas (including MEVs), LTVs, and ATVs. For detailed description, see Technical Notes.
Note that for Romania, Bulgaria & Croatia the data on LTV visas is missing.

RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year
The chart shows the number of people who have received a particular residence permit for the first time during a year, for the last four years (annual flow of resident permits). The reasons for issuing permits are 'Work', 'Family', 'Education' or 'Other' (which includes international protection).

Valid residence permits at the end of the year
The chart shows the number of migrants residing in the MS with different types of residence permits and with permits that are valid for at least five years (national and EU long term residence permits). This shows the total number of permits held by people in the country at the end of the 2024 (the migrant stock). The reasons for valid permits are the same listed above.

IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate
The bar shows the number of people who have been 'Ordered to leave' the MS and the circle shows those 'Returned to a third country/territory' following an order to leave per year.

Return rate
The return rate on the right is calculated as the ratio between the number of people returned to a third country/territory following an order to leave and the people who received an order to leave. Since it is calculated on annual data, it might result higher than 100%, because of administrative backlogs.

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Each of the pie charts, together with the relative number, shows how many people from other countries and territories have acquired the Each of the pie charts, together with the relative number, shows how many people from other countries and territories have acquired the citizenship of the MS per year. The data is broken down into (a) people whose previous citizenship was of another MS ('EU Mobile') and (b) people whose previous citizenship was of a 'Non-EU' country/territory (including both 'Stateless' and Unknown').
Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR] shows differences in income levels for adults by broad group of citizenship. The values are in euro.
Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%] shows the percentage of adults by broad group of citizenship who live in a household defined as 'overcrowded'.
Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%] shows the percentage of adults by broad group of citizenship who are either at risk of poverty, face serious material deprivation or live in a household defined as having a 'very low work intensity'.
At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%] indicates the percentage of people under 18 (by citizenship of their parents: Nationals vs Non-Nationals) who are defined as being 'at risk of poverty'.

EDUCATION (Eurostat)

The three charts show differences in educational attainment and participation in education by broad group of citizenship: 'nationals', 'EU mobile' and 'non-EU'.
Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%] refers to the proportion of people aged between 25 and 64 by their education level. 'LOW (lev 0-2)' refers to Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education; 'MEDIUM (lev 3-4)' refers to Upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary, education, and 'HIGH (lev 5-8)' refers to Tertiary education.
NEET (18-24) 2024 [%] shows the proportion of people aged between 18 and 24 who are 'Neither Employed nor in Education or Training' in the four weeks preceding the survey.
Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%] shows the proportion of people aged between 18 and 24 which has completed no more than lower secondary education and is not involved in further education or training.

LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

The four charts present employment and unemployment related indicators by broad group of citizenship ('nationals', 'EU mobile' and 'non-EU') and sex. Three charts show also a breakdown by age group, whereas the fourth one by education attainment. This section shows similarities and differences in integration of these subgroups in the labour market.
Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] shows the percentage of the total working-age population which is employed within each age group.
Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%] shows employment rates of working-age population (15-64 years old) by level of educational attainment. 'LOW' refers to Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education; 'MEDIUM' refers to Upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary, education, and 'HIGH' refers to Tertiary education.
Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] indicates the percentage of unemployed people in the labour force. It is calculated as the ratio between the unemployed population and the sum of employed and unemployed population within the same group.
Long term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] refers to people who have been unemployed for more than one year. It is calculated as the proportion of the total unemployed population within each group which has been unemployed for more than one year.

EUROPEAN UNION

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



AUSTRIA



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



BELGIUM

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



BULGARIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



CROATIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



CYPRUS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



CZECHIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



DENMARK

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



ESTONIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



FINLAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



nationals | EU mobile | non-EU | within EU | outside EU

SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



Issued (%) | Not Issued (%) | # Applied for

ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



M | F

First instance decisions



Geneva | Subsid. | Human. | Reject.

RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



Work | Family | Educat. | Other | Long term

NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



EU mobile | non-EU

IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

Ordered to leave | Returned | #% Return rate

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



FRANCE



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



GERMANY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



GREECE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



HUNGARY



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



IRELAND



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

DATA NOT AVALAIBLE

ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



ITALY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



nationals | EU mobile | non-EU | within EU | outside EU

SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



Issued (%) | Not Issued (%) | # Applied for

ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



LATVIA



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]

EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



LITHUANIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2023 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2023 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2023 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2023 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2023 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2023 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2023 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2023 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



LUXEMBOURG



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



MALTA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



NETHERLANDS



DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



POLAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



PORTUGAL

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



ROMANIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2023 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2023 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2023 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2023 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2023 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2023 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2023 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2023 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2023 by age group and sex [%]



SLOVAKIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



SLOVENIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



SPAIN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



SWEDEN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population structure 2024 (in thousands)



OVERVIEW [at 1st January] (Eurostat)

Population 2024 (in thousands)



Annual flows 2023 (in thousands)



SCHENGEN VISAS (HOME)

Visas applied for, issued and not issued (in thousands)



ASYLUM (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



SOCIAL INCLUSION (Eurostat)

Median equivalised net income (18+) 2024 [EUR]



Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2024 [%]



Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2024 [%]



At risk of poverty rate for children 2024 [%]



EDUCATION (Eurostat)

Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2024 [%]



NEET (18-24) 2024 [%]



Early school leavers (18-24) 2024 [%]



LABOUR MARKET (Eurostat)

Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Employment rate 2024 by educational attainment and sex [%]



Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



Long-term unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%]



TECHNICAL NOTES

DEMOGRAPHY [AT 1ST JANUARY] (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Population pyramid
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_pop1ctz
Description: Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_POP1CTZ/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 27/11/2025 (source last update 14/10/2025)

OVERVIEW [AT 1ST JANUARY] (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Population
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_pop1ctz
Description: Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_POP1CTZ/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation:27/11/2025 (source last update 14/10/2025)

Indicator: Immigration (annual flow)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_imm1ctz
Description: Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_IMM1CTZ/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Emigration (annual flow)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_emi3nxt
Description: Emigration by age group, sex and country of next usual residence.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_EMI3NXT/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

SCHENGEN VISAS (MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS)

Indicator: Visas
Source of data: DG HOME – Schengen visa stats
Description: Complete statistics on short-stay visas issued by the Schengen States (2009-2021) and Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania (non-Schengen EU States).
Note: A Schengen visa is an authorisation issued by a Schengen State enabling an individual to transit through or stay in its territory. Short stay visas are:
a) uniform short stay visas that entitle the holder to stay in the territories of all Member States for a period of maximum 90 days/180 days and that can be issued for the purpose of a single entry or multiple entries (MEVs);
b) short stay visas with limited territorial validity (LTV) that entitle the holder to stay only in the territory of the Member State(s) for which the visa is valid.
Data on LTV visas is not available for Romania, Bulgaria & Croatia.
Note that respect to the previous AoM issues, ATVs have been removed from the total account of visas applied for, issued and not issued. An Airport transit visa (ATV) entitles the holder to transit through the international transit area of airports situated on the territory of a Member State without actually entering the territory of that Member State, during a stopover or transfer between two stages of an international flight..
Link: : https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/visa-policy_en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2024 (source last update 19/05/2025)

ASYLUM [1ST INSTANCE] (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: First time applications
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_asyappctza
Description: Asylum applicants by type of applicant, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data.
Note: First-time asylum applicants are people who lodged an application for asylum for the first time in a given Member State during the reference period. The term 'first-time' implies no time limitation

and therefore a person can be recorded as first-time applicant only if he or she had never applied for international protection in the reporting country in the past, irrespective of whether they are found to have applied in another Member State of the European Union.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asyappctza/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 01/09/2025)

Indicator: First instance decisions by outcome
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_asydcfsta
Description: First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data.
Note: First instance decision means a decision granted by the respective authority acting as a first instance of the administrative asylum procedure in the receiving country.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asydcfsta/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 28/08/2025)

RESIDENCE PERMITS (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: First residence permits (by reason)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_resfirst
Description: First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship.
Note: Any authorisation issued to a person for the first time by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third country national to stay legally on its territory. The dataset is disaggregated by the following groups of reasons: Remunerated activities (referred to as 'Work'), Family, Education and Other. The group 'Other' includes Refugee status and subsidiary protection; Humanitarian reasons; Residence only; Unaccompanied minors; Victims of trafficking in human beings; and Other reasons not specified. For further information, the reader can refer to the specific dataset from Eurostat (migr_resoth: 'First permits issued for other reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship').
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resfirst/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 29/10/2025)

Indicator: Valid permits (stock) – Valid long-term permits at the end of the year
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_resvalid
Description: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year
Note: The dataset includes the same four groups of reasons as the First residence permits dataset, as well as two additional groups: Refugee status and Subsidiary protection. For consistency in the data presentation, these two have been aggregated into the group 'Other'.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resvalid/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Valid permits (stock) – Valid long-term permits at the end of the year
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_reslong
Description: Long-term residents by citizenship on 31 December of each year.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_reslong/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

NATURALISATION (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Foreign citizens who have acquired citizenship during the year
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_acq
Description: Acquisition of citizenship by age group, sex and former citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_acq/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 05/05/2025)

Indicator: Share of foreign citizens who have acquired citizenship [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_acqs
Description: Residents who acquired citizenship as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship and sex.

Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_acqs/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 02/04/2025)

IRREGULAR MIGRATION (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Ordered to leave
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_eiord
Description: Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eiord/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Returned (to a third country following an order to leave)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_eirtn
Description: Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eirtn/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Return rate
Note: The Return rate is calculated by JRC as the ratio between Returned and Ordered to leave

SOCIAL INCLUSION (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Median equivalised net income (18+) 2021 [EUR]
Source of data: Eurostat - ilc_di15
Description: Mean and median income by group of citizenship (population aged 18 and over).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_di15/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Household overcrowding rate (18+) 2021 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - ilc_lvho15
Description: Overcrowding rate by age, sex and group of citizenship (total population aged 18 and over).
Note: The overcrowding rate is defined as the percentage of the population living in an overcrowded household. A person is considered as living in an overcrowded household if the household does not have at its disposal a minimum number of rooms equal to: one room for the household; one room per couple in the household; one room for each single person aged 18 or more; one room per pair of single people of the same gender between 12 and 17 years of age; one room for each single person between 12 and 17 years of age and not included in the previous category; one room per pair of children under 12 years of age.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_lvho15/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18+) 2020 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - ilc_peps05n
Description: Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion by group of citizenship (population aged 18 and over).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_peps05n/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 28/10/2025)

Indicator: At risk of poverty rate for children 2021 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - ilc_li33
Description: At-risk-of poverty rate for children by citizenship of their parents (population aged 0 to 17 years).
Note: The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. This indicator does not measure wealth or poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that country, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_li33/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

EDUCATION (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Population (25-64) by educational attainment 2021 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - edat_lfs_9911
Description: Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and citizenship (%).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfs_9911/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

Indicator: NEET (18-24) 2021 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - edat_lfse_23
Description: Young people neither in employment nor in education and training by sex, age and citizenship (NEET rates).
Note: The indicator corresponds to the percentage of the population of a given age group which is neither employed nor involved in further education or training. This refers to persons meeting these two conditions: they are not employed (i.e. unemployed or inactive according to the International Labour Organisation definition); they have not received any education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey. The denominator is the total population of the same age group, excluding the respondents who have not answered the question 'participation to regular education and training'
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfse_23/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

Indicator: Early school leavers (18-24) 2021 [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - edat_lfse_01
Description: Early leavers from education and training by sex and citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfse_01/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

LABOUR MARKET (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Employment rate 2021 by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - lfsa_ergan
Description: Employment rates by sex, age and citizenship (%).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_ergan/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

Indicator: Employment rate 2021 by educational attainment and sex [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - lfsa_ergaedn
Description: Employment rates by sex, age, educational attainment level and citizenship.
Note: The charts refer to the 15-64 age group
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_ergaedn/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 21/10/2025)

Indicator: Unemployment rate 2021 by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - lfsa_urgan
Description: Unemployment rates by sex, age and citizenship (%).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_urgan/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

Indicator: Long term unemployment rate 2021 by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: Eurostat - lfsa_upgan
Description: Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of the total unemployed population, by sex, age and citizenship (%).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_upgan/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/09/2025)

MIGRATION IN **NON EU COUNTRIES/ TERRITORIES**



HOW TO READ

This section provides a two-page migration profile for 171 non-EU countries and territories grouped by geographical continent and subcontinents according to Eurostat guidelines. This organisation is based on geographical criteria only and does not have any political implication. More detailed information is available in the Technical Notes at the end of this section. For each country/territory, the charts are organised in thematic parts. Maps and flags are for illustrative purposes only.
The data refers to 2024. Whenever 2024 data is not available from the original source, latest available values are provided. If there is no data the corresponding field is either missing or indicated as 'N/A'
Note that in some cases, the sum of percentages or of individual values might not add up to 100 or to the total value. This is due to rounding and confidence intervals.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory

The chart is relative to migrant population estimates (stock) at mid-year. The four bars on the left shows the total number of people residing in the country/territory who have immigrated from the EU ('EU') or from somewhere else in the world ('other'). The four bars on the right shows the total number of people from the country/territory who have emigrated to the EU ('EU') or to somewhere else in the world ('other').
UNDESA estimates on migration stocks are available every five years with latest revision in 2024.

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications

The chart shows the number of citizens from the country/territory who have made a first application for asylum in an EU MS per year. The data covers multiple years and is broken down by sex. The total number of annual applications is at the bottom of the chart.

First instance decisions

The chart shows the decisions made by EU MS on asylum applications by nationals of the country/territory. Outcomes are one of the following:

- 'Geneva' for 'Geneva convention status';
- 'Subsid.' for 'Subsidiary protection';
- 'Human.' for 'Humanitarian protection';
- 'Reject.' for 'Rejected application'.

The annual number of first instance decisions is on the right of the chart.

NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

The bar chart shows the acquisition of citizenship over each of the last four years by people who are nationals of this country/territory and have moved to an EU MS.

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population - 2024

The figure on the top shows the total population estimates (in thousands) in the medium fertility variant scenario.
The pyramid shows the demographic composition of the population in the country/territory. It indicates the estimated number of people (in thousands) by age group and sex (males and females) in 2024. The original UNDESA estimates are organised in five-year cohorts and have been aggregated to obtain ten-year cohorts.
The figure on the bottom shows the population change (%) between 2024 and 2050 according to the medium fertility variant scenario

REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs - 2024

The chart shows the number of people at the end of the reference year for the following groups:

- Refugees and people in refugee-like situations from the country/territory residing in an EU MS ('EU') or in countries and territories other than that of birth and outside the EU ('other');
- Refugees and people in refugee-like situations in the country/territory;
- Internally Displaced People (IDPs) due to armed conflict, generalised violence or human rights violations in the country/territory as well as to natural disasters.
- Data on refugees and people in refugee-like situations is from UNHCR and UNRWA. Data on IDPs is from IDMC

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year

The chart shows the number of people from the country/territory who have received a first residence permit in an EU MS each year, during the last four years. The reasons for issuing permits are 'Work', 'Family', 'Education' or 'Other' (which includes all forms of National and International Protection. Further details in Technical Notes).

Valid resident permits at the end of the year

The chart shows the number of migrants from the country/territory residing in the EU at the end of the year and the different types of residence permits that they hold. It also shows the number of people with permits that are valid for at least five years (national and EU long term residence permits). This signals the total number of permits held by people in the country/territory at the end of 2024 (the migrant stock).

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

The bar chart shows the annual number of people from the country/territory who have been 'Ordered to leave' the MS and those who have physically 'Returned' to their country/territory of origin or another third country. From this data a 'Return rate' has been calculated. This is the ratio between the number of people physically returned and the people ordered to leave. Since it is calculated on annual data, the return rate might result higher than 100%, because of administrative backlogs.

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

Global Peace Index, Political stability, Control of Corruption, and Government effectiveness.
The four indicators give an overview of the political context in the selected country/territory.
For countries/territories factsheets, the number at the top shows the latest available data. The line shows the trend over time for the annual value.
For continent and subcontinent factsheets, the value of the indicator is shown for the top and bottom two countries within the region.
See Technical Notes at the end of this section for definitions and additional info on the four indicators.

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Humanitarian aid + ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP].
The chart presents aggregated data on 'Remittances', Humanitarian aid plus Official Development Assistance ('Hum Aid + ODA') and Net Foreign Direct Investments ('Net FDIs') sent to the country/territory during the reference year. Values are shown as a percentage of the country's GDP.
For countries/territories factsheets, the bars show these three types of financial transfers in the last four years .
For continent and subcontinent factsheets, the value of the three indicators is shown for the countries within the region with the highest value of remittances as percentage of the GDP.
See Technical Notes at the end of this section for definition and info on the three financial inflows.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

Below international poverty line, GDP per capita (PPP), Urban population, and Under 5 mortality rate
The four indicators give an overview of the context of the social conditions in the selected country/territory.
For countries/territories factsheets, the number at the top shows the latest available data. The line shows the trend over time for the annual value.
For continent and subcontinent factsheets, the value of the indicator is shown for the top and bottom two countries within the region.
See Technical Notes at the end of this section for definitions and additional info on the four indicators.

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs, Government expenditures in education, and Working-age population by sex and education
The three indicators give an overview of human capital in the selected country/territory.
For countries/territories factsheets, the number at the top shows the latest available data. The line shows the trend over time for the annual value.
For continent and subcontinent factsheets, the value of the indicator is shown for the top and bottom two countries within the region.
See Technical Notes at the end of this section for definitions and additional info on the four indicators.

LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

The four charts present an overview of labour market conditions in the selected country/territory by sex. Three charts show also a breakdown by age group, whereas the fourth one by economic sector. All values are modelled estimates from the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Labour force participation rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] shows a proportion (%) of the population that engages actively in the labour market (working or looking for work) relative to the population at working-age. The figures are disaggregated by age group and sex.
Employment 2024 by economic sector and sex [thousand] shows the number of persons of working-age who were in paid employment or self-employment. The figures are disaggregate by economic sector (Services, Industry and Agriculture) and sex. The overall figure is on the top.
Employment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] shows the proportion (%) of employed among working-age population. The figures are disaggregated by age group and sex.
Unemployment rate 2024 by age group and sex [%] shows the number of persons who are unemployed as a percent of the total number of employed and unemployed persons. The figures are disaggregated by age group and sex.

For countries/territories factsheets, the chart shows the indicator disaggregated by possible dimensions.
For continent and subcontinent factsheets, the value of the indicator is shown for the top and bottom two countries within the region.
See Technical Notes at the end of this section for definitions and additional info on the four indicators.



MIGRATION IN **EUROPE** (NON-EU)

EUROPE (NON-EU)

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.1 Iceland	[1] 99.5 Cayman Islands	[1] 2.11 Norway	[1] 2.1 Switzerland
[2] 1.3 Switzerland	[2] 99.1 Liechtenstein	[2] 2.02 Switzerland	[2] 2.0 Monaco
[14] 3.2 Ukraine	[21] 13.3 Russia	[21] -0.69 Ukraine	[21] -1.0 Bosnia and Herzegovina
[15] 3.2 Russia	[22] 10.9 Ukraine	[22] -1.10 Russia	[22] -1.0 Belarus

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Belarus	[1] 91 108 $ Norway	[1] 15% Liechtenstein	[1] 1.6 San Marino
[2] 0.0% Ukraine	[2] 82 026 $ Switzerland	[2] 44% Moldova	[2] 2.4 Norway
[15] 3.9% North Macedonia	[17] 16 381 $ Kosovo	[22] 100% Gibraltar	[20] 13.9 British Virgin Islands
[16] 10.0% Kosovo	[18] 16 320 $ Ukraine	[23] 100% Monaco	[21] 14.9 Moldova

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 3.8% Iceland	[1] 7.3% Iceland
[2] 5.3% Belarus	[2] 6.6% Moldova
[12] 22.5% Türkiye	[19] 1.9% Andorra
[13] 23.6% Albania	[20] 1.7% Monaco

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
European (non-EU) countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 74.7% Iceland	(70.3% women, 78.8% men)
[2] 70.9% Moldova	(70.1% women, 71.7% men)
[12] 49.3% Bosnia and Herzegovina	(39.4% women, 60.4% men)
[13] 48.0% Montenegro	(41.4% women, 55.4% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 159 137 K (45% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
European (non-EU) countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 72.3% Iceland	(68.2% women, 76.3% men)
[2] 69.8% Moldova	(69.3% women, 70.5% men)
[12] 44.0% Bosnia and Herzegovina	(34.3% women, 54.9% men)
[13] 41.3% Montenegro	(36.1% women, 47.0% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
European (non-EU) countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 2.9% Moldova	(2.3% women, 3.5% men)
[2] 5.1% Russia	(5.3% women, 4.8% men)
[12] 26.8% North Macedonia	(24.3% women, 28.6% men)
[13] 28.2% Montenegro	(25.3% women, 30.6% men)

ALBANIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ANDORRA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 82



Population change (2024-2050) +0.3%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

BELARUS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 9 057



Population change (2024-2050) -17.7%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ICELAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 393



Population change (2024-2050) +10.1%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









KOSOVO*

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Kosovo is a UN admin. region under security council resolution 1244. For statistical purposes, data for Serbia does not include this area.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Data on Kosovo is included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source.

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

LIECHTENSTEIN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

First instance decisions

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

MOLDOVA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Transnistria.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MONACO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

MONTENEGRO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 638



Population change (2024-2050) -16.5%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NORTH MACEDONIA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



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

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

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

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

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



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

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NORWAY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 5 577



Population change (2024-2050) +5.8%

NOTE: Including Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









RUSSIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SAN MARINO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 34



Population change (2024-2050) +0.3%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SERBIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: For statistical purposes, data for Serbia does not include Kosovo (UN admin. region under security council resolution 1244).

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



Data on Kosovo is included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source.

REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SWITZERLAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 8 922



Population change (2024-2050) +4.7%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TÜRKIYE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









UKRAINE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 37 860



Population change (2024-2050) -15.5%

NOTE: Including Crimea.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

UNITED KINGDOM

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Refers to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Data does not include the Overseas territories.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









VATICAN CITY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]	Working age population by education level
N/A	N/A	N/A

LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE



MIGRATION IN **AFRICA**

AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.6 Mauritius	[1] 87.2 Botswana	[1] 1.63 Seychelles	[1] 0.7 Mauritius
[2] 1.8 Botswana	[2] 79.1 Cape Verde	[2] 0.98 Cape Verde	[2] 0.6 Seychelles
[49] 3.2 South Sudan	[53] 1.9 Sudan	[53] -1.73 Somalia	[53] -2.0 Somalia
[50] 3.3 Sudan	[54] 0.5 Mali	[54] -1.97 South Sudan	[54] -2.3 South Sudan

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Algeria	[1] 29 242 $ Seychelles	[1] 15% Burundi	[1] 11.2 Libya
[2] 0.5% Mauritius	[2] 27 317 $ Mauritius	[2] 17% Niger	[2] 13.3 Cape Verde
[50] 81.4% Mozambique	[51] 1 112 $ Central African Republic	[53] 82% Libya	[53] 120.6 Niger
[51] 85.3% Democratic Republic of the Congo	[52] 836 $ Burundi	[54] 91% Gabon	[54] 122.6 Central African Republic

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 12.6% Burundi	[1] 9.1% Namibia
[2] 13.0% Tanzania	[2] 8.1% Botswana
[52] 47.0% Sudan	[51] 0.3% Nigeria
[53] 49.8% Sao Tome and Principe	[52] 0.0% Somalia

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
African countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 85.1% Madagascar	(82.6% women, 87.6% men)
[2] 83.7% Tanzania	(80.2% women, 87.4% men)
[50] 32.0% Djibouti	(18.7% women, 45.8% men)
[51] 23.5% Sao Tome and Principe	(23.1% women, 24.0% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 530 701 K (43% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
African countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 82.5% Madagascar	(79.9% women, 85.2% men)
[2] 81.6% Tanzania	(77.4% women, 86.0% men)
[50] 23.7% Djibouti	(12.0% women, 35.9% men)
[51] 21.4% Sao Tome and Principe	(20.9% women, 21.8% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
African countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 0.7% Niger	(0.5% women, 0.8% men)
[2] 1.8% Burundi	(1.6% women, 2.0% men)
[50] 66.3% South Africa	(70.8% women, 62.3% men)
[51] 68.8% Eswatini	(72.4% women, 65.4% men)

CENTRAL AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.9 Angola	[1] 60.2 Sao Tome and Principe	[1] 0.36 Sao Tome and Principe	[1] -0.8 Gabon
[2] 2.1 Equatorial Guinea	[2] 46.9 Congo	[2] -0.61 Angola	[2] -0.9 Sao Tome and Principe
[7] 2.9 Central African Republic	[8] 5.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo	[8] -1.48 Chad	[8] -1.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo
[8] 3.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo	[9] 3.3 Central African Republic	[9] -1.57 Equatorial Guinea	[9] -1.7 Central African Republic

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 3.8% Gabon	[1] 18 923 $ Gabon	[1] 25% Chad	[1] 16.0 Sao Tome and Principe
[2] 8.8% Equatorial Guinea	[2] 15 454 $ Equatorial Guinea	[2] 44% Central African Republic	[2] 36.2 Gabon
[8] 71.6% Central African Republic	[8] 1 504 $ Democratic Republic of the Congo	[8] 77% Sao Tome and Principe	[8] 111.0 Chad
[9] 85.3% Democratic Republic of the Congo	[9] 1 112 $ Central African Republic	[9] 91% Gabon	[9] 122.6 Central African Republic

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 21.4% Angola	[1] 5.0% Sao Tome and Principe
[2] 23.1% Cameroon	[2] 3.3% Congo
[8] 37.0% Chad	[7] 2.3% Gabon
[9] 49.8% Sao Tome and Principe	[8] 1.8% Central African Republic

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Central African countries - 2024

[1] 75.7% Angola	(73.1% women, 78.4% men)	
[2] 73.6% Central African Republic	(65.8% women, 82.9% men)	
[8] 51.1% Gabon	(41.7% women, 60.1% men)	
[9] 23.5% Sao Tome and Principe	(23.1% women, 24.0% men)	

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 70 538 K (47% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central African countries - 2024

[1] 69.2% Central African Republic	(61.4% women, 78.5% men)	
[2] 64.8% Angola	(62.5% women, 67.1% men)	
[8] 40.9% Gabon	(29.8% women, 51.5% men)	
[9] 21.4% Sao Tome and Principe	(20.9% women, 21.8% men)	

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central African countries - 2024

[1] 1.1% Chad	(0.7% women, 1.3% men)	
[2] 3.5% Cameroon	(4.1% women, 3.1% men)	
[8] 19.7% Congo	(21.0% women, 18.4% men)	
[9] 20.1% Gabon	(28.7% women, 14.3% men)	

ANGOLA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CAMEROON

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CHAD

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CONGO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









EQUATORIAL GUINEA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GABON

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









EASTERN AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
	[1] 1.6 Mauritius	[1] 74.9 Mauritius	[1] 1.63 Seychelles	[1] 0.7 Mauritius
	[2] 1.8 Madagascar	[2] 73.9 Seychelles	[2] 0.67 Rwanda	[2] 0.6 Seychelles
	[14] 2.7 Ethiopia	[16] 6.2 Ethiopia	[16] -1.56 Burundi	[16] -1.8 Eritrea
	[15] 3.0 Somalia	[17] 2.8 Somalia	[17] -1.73 Somalia	[17] -2.0 Somalia

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
	[1] 0.5% Mauritius	[1] 29 242 $ Seychelles	[1] 15% Burundi	[1] 14.8 Seychelles
	[2] 0.7% Seychelles	[2] 27 317 $ Mauritius	[2] 18% Rwanda	[2] 15.8 Mauritius
	[14] 75.4% Malawi	[15] 1 408 $ Somalia	[16] 59% Seychelles	[16] 67.3 Mozambique
	[15] 81.4% Mozambique	[16] 836 $ Burundi	[17] 79% Djibouti	[17] 114.4 Somalia

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 12.6% Burundi	[1] 6.0% Mozambique
[2] 13.0% Tanzania	[2] 4.9% Burundi
[15] 29.5% Zambia	[16] 0.4% Zimbabwe
[16] 43.8% Somalia	[17] 0.0% Somalia

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern African countries - 2024

[1] 85.1%	Madagascar	(82.6% women, 87.6% men)
[2] 83.7%	Tanzania	(80.2% women, 87.4% men)
[15] 33.9%	Somalia	(20.9% women, 47.1% men)
[16] 32.0%	Djibouti	(18.7% women, 45.8% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 191 546 K (46% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern African countries - 2024

[1] 82.5%	Madagascar	(79.9% women, 85.2% men)
[2] 81.6%	Tanzania	(77.4% women, 86.0% men)
[15] 27.5%	Somalia	(15.8% women, 39.4% men)
[16] 23.7%	Djibouti	(12.0% women, 35.9% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern African countries - 2024

[1] 0.9%	Burundi	(0.8% women, 1.0% men)
[2] 2.6%	Tanzania	(3.5% women, 1.7% men)
[15] 18.9%	Somalia	(24.5% women, 16.3% men)
[16] 25.9%	Djibouti	(35.6% women, 21.7% men)

BURUNDI



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









COMOROS



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



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

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









DJIBOUTI



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ERITREA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ETHIOPIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



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Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

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Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

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

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









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

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









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

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MALAWI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MAURITIUS



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Agalega, Rodrigues and Saint Brandon.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MOZAMBIQUE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









RWANDA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









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

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOMALIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TANZANIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Zanzibar.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









UGANDA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ZAMBIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ZIMBABWE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NORTHERN AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 2.0 Tunisia	[1] 29.9 Morocco	[1] -0.34 Tunisia	[1] 0.0 Morocco
[2] 2.0 Morocco	[2] 23.2 Algeria	[2] -0.54 Morocco	[2] -0.2 Egypt
[6] 3.2 South Sudan	[6] 3.8 South Sudan	[6] -1.53 Libya	[6] -2.0 Sudan
[7] 3.3 Sudan	[7] 1.9 Sudan	[7] -1.97 South Sudan	[7] -2.3 South Sudan

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Algeria	[1] 16 798 $ Egypt	[1] 22% South Sudan	[1] 11.2 Libya
[2] 0.7% Tunisia	[2] 15 442 $ Algeria	[2] 37% Sudan	[2] 16.0 Tunisia
[5] 10.1% Sudan	[5] 9 066 $ Morocco	[6] 76% Algeria	[6] 55.3 Sudan
[6] 76.5% South Sudan	[6] 1 872 $ Sudan	[7] 82% Libya	[7] 98.7 South Sudan

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 20.1% Algeria	[1] 6.7% Tunisia
[2] 22.7% Tunisia	[2] 6.0% Morocco
[6] 33.6% South Sudan	[5] 2.0% Sudan
[7] 47.0% Sudan	[6] 1.6% South Sudan

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Northern African countries - 2024

[1] 48.2% Libya	(32.8% women, 63.3% men)
[2] 45.5% Tunisia	(26.7% women, 65.4% men)
[4] 42.6% Egypt	(15.1% women, 69.9% men)
[5] 40.8% Algeria	(14.0% women, 66.5% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 63 923 K (20% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Northern African countries - 2024

[1] 40.1% Morocco	(17.5% women, 62.6% men)
[2] 39.5% Egypt	(12.4% women, 66.5% men)
[4] 38.2% Tunisia	(20.8% women, 56.4% men)
[5] 36.1% Algeria	(11.1% women, 60.2% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Northern African countries - 2024

[1] 7.2% Egypt	(18.0% women, 4.9% men)
[2] 8.9% Morocco	(10.5% women, 8.5% men)
[4] 16.2% Tunisia	(21.9% women, 13.8% men)
[5] 18.6% Libya	(24.8% women, 15.5% men)

ALGERIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









EGYPT

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









LIBYA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MOROCCO



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTH SUDAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SUDAN



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TUNISIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTHERN AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
top & bottom countries	[1] 1.8 Botswana	[1] 87.2 Botswana	[1] 0.69 Botswana	[1] 0.4 Botswana
	[2] 1.9 Namibia	[2] 63.5 Namibia	[2] 0.11 Namibia	[2] 0.0 Namibia
	[4] 2.3 Lesotho	[4] 30.8 Eswatini	[4] -0.51 Lesotho	[4] -0.9 Eswatini
	[5] 2.4 South Africa	[5] 20.9 South Africa	[5] -0.73 Eswatini	[5] -1.0 Lesotho

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
top & bottom countries	[1] 21.4% Botswana	[1] 18 069 $ Botswana	[1] 25% Eswatini	[1] 34.1 South Africa
	[2] 22.9% Namibia	[2] 13 599 $ South Africa	[2] 31% Lesotho	[2] 43.9 Botswana
	[4] 41.9% Lesotho	[4] 10 281 $ Namibia	[4] 69% South Africa	[4] 49.8 Eswatini
	[5] 44.5% Eswatini	[5] 2 638 $ Lesotho	[5] 73% Botswana	[5] 66.8 Lesotho

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

	NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
top & bottom countries	[1] 30.6% Namibia	[1] 9.1% Namibia
	[2] 33.9% South Africa	[2] 8.1% Botswana
	[4] 35.5% Eswatini	[4] 6.0% Eswatini
	[5] 37.6% Botswana	[5] 6.0% South Africa

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Southern African countries - 2024

- [1] 68.6% Botswana (63.8% women, 73.4% men)
- [2] 59.2% Namibia (55.4% women, 63.3% men)
- [4] 57.8% Lesotho (48.7% women, 67.7% men)
- [5] 47.2% Eswatini (44.8% women, 49.6% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 21 316 K (45% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Southern African countries - 2024

- [1] 52.7% Botswana (46.7% women, 58.8% men)
- [2] 48.4% Lesotho (39.8% women, 57.9% men)
- [4] 39.1% South Africa (34.2% women, 44.4% men)
- [5] 30.9% Eswatini (28.6% women, 33.4% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Southern African countries - 2024

- [1] 16.1% Lesotho (18.3% women, 14.4% men)
- [2] 19.1% Namibia (17.9% women, 20.3% men)
- [4] 33.2% South Africa (35.4% women, 31.2% men)
- [5] 34.4% Eswatini (36.2% women, 32.7% men)

BOTSWANA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ESWATINI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









LESOTHO



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NAMIBIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTH AFRICA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



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

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









WESTERN AFRICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 456 251



Population change (2024-2050) +61.1%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
	[1] 1.9 Ghana	[1] 79.1 Cape Verde	[1] 0.98 Cape Verde	[1] 0.1 Senegal
	[2] 1.9 Sierra Leone	[2] 46.0 The Gambia	[2] 0.06 Senegal	[2] 0.0 Cape Verde
	[14] 3.0 Burkina Faso	[15] 5.7 Burkina Faso	[15] -1.04 Nigeria	[15] -1.4 Liberia
	[15] 3.0 Mali	[16] 0.5 Mali	##########	##########

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
	[1] 10.2% Mauritania	[1] 9 908 $ Cape Verde	[1] 17% Niger	[1] 13.3 Cape Verde
	[2] 11.7% Guinea	[2] 7 062 $ Ghana	[2] 33% Burkina Faso	[2] 41.7 Mauritania
	[15] 42.1% Burkina Faso	[15] 1 773 $ Niger	[15] 65% The Gambia	[15] 114.4 Nigeria
	[16] 60.5% Niger	[16] 1 658 $ Liberia	[16] 68% Cape Verde	[16] 120.6 Niger

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 13.3% Togo	[1] 6.2% Senegal
[2] 13.4% Nigeria	[2] 5.3% Burkina Faso
[15] 36.5% Mauritania	[15] 1.7% Guinea
[16] 39.7% The Gambia	[16] 0.3% Nigeria

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Western African countries - 2024

[1] 82.6% Nigeria	(80.7% women, 84.4% men)
[2] 76.8% Liberia	(72.1% women, 81.7% men)
[15] 47.1% Burkina Faso	(41.0% women, 53.5% men)
[16] 40.9% Mauritania	(26.1% women, 56.9% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 183 378 K (46% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Western African countries - 2024

[1] 80.1% Nigeria	(77.5% women, 82.7% men)
[2] 74.6% Liberia	(70.5% women, 78.8% men)
[15] 44.4% The Gambia	(42.6% women, 46.3% men)
[16] 36.6% Mauritania	(22.2% women, 52.3% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Western African countries - 2024

[1] 0.4% Niger	(0.3% women, 0.4% men)
[2] 1.7% Benin	(1.6% women, 1.9% men)
[15] 10.4% Mauritania	(15.0% women, 8.0% men)
[16] 11.9% Cape Verde	(11.3% women, 12.3% men)

BENIN



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



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

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

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

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

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First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



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

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BURKINA FASO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CAPE VERDE



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CÔTE D'IVOIRE



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GHANA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GUINEA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GUINEA-BISSAU



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









LIBERIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MALI



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MAURITANIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NIGER

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NIGERIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SENEGAL

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









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

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









THE GAMBIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TOGO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MIGRATION IN **ASIA**

ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.3 Singapore	[1] 97.2 Singapore	[1] 2.04 Singapore	[1] 2.3 Singapore
[2] 1.4 Malaysia	[2] 96.7 Brunei	[2] 1.63 Hong Kong	[2] 1.6 Japan
[44] 3.2 Afghanistan	[48] 0.9 Yemen	[48] -1.65 Yemen	[48] -2.0 Afghanistan
[45] 3.3 Yemen	[49] 0.0 Syria	[49] -1.75 Syria	[49] -2.3 Yemen

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Azerbaijan	[1] 132 570 $ Singapore	[1] 19% Sri Lanka	[1] 2.3 Singapore
[2] 0.0% Bhutan	[2] 112 844 $ Macao	[2] 22% Nepal	[2] 2.4 Japan
[35] 33.3% Yemen	[40] 4 186 $ Timor-Leste	[47] 100% Macao	[45] 61.3 Afghanistan
[36] 43.9% Timor-Leste	[41] 3 846 $ Palestine	[48] 100% Singapore	[46] 64.6 Pakistan

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 3.1% Japan	[1] 6.8% Kyrgyzstan
[2] 3.6% Azerbaijan	[2] 6.4% Kuwait
[45] 45.7% Yemen	[45] 1.2% Laos
[46] 55.4% Afghanistan	[46] 1.2% Lebanon

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Asian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 87.5% Qatar	(63.3% women, 95.6% men)
[2] 82.1% North Korea	(77.7% women, 86.7% men)
[44] 37.5% Afghanistan	(5.1% women, 69.9% men)
[45] 32.8% Yemen	(4.9% women, 60.5% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 2 077 089 K (37% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Asian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 87.4% Qatar	(63.1% women, 95.5% men)
[2] 79.8% North Korea	(75.4% women, 84.3% men)
[44] 31.5% Jordan	(10.2% women, 51.3% men)
[45] 27.2% Yemen	(3.5% women, 50.8% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Asian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 0.3% Qatar	(0.8% women, 0.1% men)
[2] 0.5% Cambodia	(0.6% women, 0.5% men)
[44] 34.2% Yemen	(59.0% women, 32.2% men)
[45] 36.0% Jordan	(53.2% women, 32.3% men)

CENTRAL ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.9 Kazakhstan	[1] 43.1 Turkmenistan	[1] -0.27 Kazakhstan	[1] 0.1 Kazakhstan
[2] 1.9 Uzbekistan	[2] 40.8 Uzbekistan	[2] -0.81 Uzbekistan	[2] -0.3 Uzbekistan
[4] 2.0 Tajikistan	[4] 27.5 Tajikistan	[4] -1.38 Tajikistan	[4] -0.9 Kyrgyzstan
[5] 2.1 Turkmenistan	[5] 26.5 Kyrgyzstan	[5] -1.42 Turkmenistan	[5] -1.2 Turkmenistan

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Kazakhstan	[1] 35 905 $ Kazakhstan	[1] 29% Tajikistan	[1] 10.1 Kazakhstan
[2] 2.7% Kyrgyzstan	[2] 17 954 $ Turkmenistan	[2] 38% Kyrgyzstan	[2] 15.0 Uzbekistan
[3] 2.7% Uzbekistan	[4] 7 046 $ Kyrgyzstan	[4] 55% Turkmenistan	[4] 28.0 Tajikistan
[4] 6.1% Tajikistan	[5] 4 756 $ Tajikistan	[5] 58% Kazakhstan	[5] 42.6 Turkmenistan

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 7.3% Kazakhstan	[1] 6.8% Kyrgyzstan
[2] 14.2% Turkmenistan	[2] 5.5% Uzbekistan
[4] 15.6% Kyrgyzstan	[4] 4.8% Kazakhstan
[5] 36.4% Tajikistan	[5] 2.7% Turkmenistan

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Central Asian countries - 2024

[1] 70.7% Kazakhstan	(66.0% women, 75.9% men)
[2] 65.4% Kyrgyzstan	(53.0% women, 78.6% men)
[4] 47.6% Turkmenistan	(48.7% women, 46.5% men)
[5] 41.2% Tajikistan	(31.8% women, 51.3% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 30 622 K (42% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central Asian countries - 2024

[1] 67.3% Kazakhstan	(62.4% women, 72.7% men)
[2] 63.3% Kyrgyzstan	(51.1% women, 76.2% men)
[4] 45.6% Turkmenistan	(47.4% women, 43.6% men)
[5] 36.4% Tajikistan	(28.4% women, 44.9% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central Asian countries - 2024

[1] 3.3% Kyrgyzstan	(3.5% women, 3.1% men)
[2] 4.3% Turkmenistan	(2.7% women, 6.1% men)
[4] 4.8% Kazakhstan	(5.4% women, 4.2% men)
[5] 11.6% Tajikistan	(10.6% women, 12.3% men)

KAZAKHSTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









KYRGYSTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TAJIKISTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TURKMENISTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









UZBEKISTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









EASTERN ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.5 Japan	[1] 81.5 Japan	[1] 1.40 Japan	[1] 1.6 Japan
[2] 1.7 Taiwan	[2] 74.4 Taiwan	[2] 1.20 Taiwan	[2] 1.5 Taiwan
[5] 2.0 China	[5] 30.3 North Korea	[5] -0.49 Mongolia	[5] -0.5 Mongolia
[6] 2.9 North Korea	[6] 25.1 China	[6] -1.58 North Korea	[6] -1.5 North Korea

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% China	[1] 66 171 $ Hong Kong	[1] 64% North Korea	[1] 2.4 Japan
[2] 0.2% South Korea	[2] 46 097 $ Japan	[2] 66% China	[2] 3.0 South Korea
[3] 0.4% Mongolia	[3] 23 846 $ China	[5] 92% Japan	[4] 14.8 Mongolia
[4] 1.2% Japan	[4] 16 801 $ Mongolia	[6] 100% Hong Kong	[5] 17.4 North Korea

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 3.1% Japan	[1] 5.8% South Korea
[2] 9.3% Taiwan	[2] 4.0% China
[5] 11.6% China	[4] 3.7% Mongolia
[6] 14.7% Mongolia	[5] 3.3% Japan

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 82.1% North Korea	(77.7% women, 86.7% men)
[2] 65.4% China	(59.6% women, 71.1% men)
[5] 60.6% Mongolia	(53.1% women, 68.5% men)
[6] 59.2% Taiwan	(51.8% women, 66.9% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 875 003 K (45% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 79.8% North Korea	(75.4% women, 84.3% men)
[2] 62.5% South Korea	(54.6% women, 70.6% men)
[5] 57.3% Mongolia	(50.6% women, 64.3% men)
[6] 57.0% Taiwan	(50.0% women, 64.3% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 2.6% Japan	(2.3% women, 2.8% men)
[2] 2.6% South Korea	(2.6% women, 2.6% men)
[5] 4.6% China	(4.0% women, 5.1% men)
[6] 5.4% Mongolia	(4.6% women, 6.1% men)

CHINA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: For statistical purposes, data for China does not include Hong Kong and Macao, Special Administrative Regions of China, and Taiwan.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









JAPAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MONGOLIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NORTH KOREA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTH KOREA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TAIWAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include this area.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
	[1] 1.3 Singapore	[1] 97.2 Singapore	[1] 2.04 Singapore	[1] 2.3 Singapore
	[2] 1.4 Malaysia	[2] 96.7 Brunei	[2] 1.28 Brunei	[2] 1.4 Brunei
	[9] 2.2 Philippines	[10] 23.7 Philippines	[10] -1.22 Myanmar	[10] -0.8 Timor-Leste
	##########	[11] 4.7 Myanmar	[11] -1.30 Cambodia	[11] -1.8 Myanmar

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
	[1] 0.0% Malaysia	[1] 132 570 $ Singapore	[1] 26% Cambodia	[1] 2.3 Singapore
	[2] 0.0% Thailand	[2] 79 184 $ Brunei	[2] 32% Myanmar	[2] 8.1 Malaysia
	[7] 15.7% Laos	[10] 5 276 $ Myanmar	[10] 79% Brunei	[10] 43.4 Laos
	[8] 43.9% Timor-Leste	[11] 4 186 $ Timor-Leste	[11] 100% Singapore	[11] 54.2 Timor-Leste

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 6.8% Singapore	[1] 5.2% Timor-Leste
[2] 10.2% Malaysia	[2] 4.4% Brunei
[10] 22.5% Laos	[10] 1.3% Indonesia
[11] 29.1% Timor-Leste	[11] 1.2% Laos

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
South-Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 80.0% Cambodia	(74.0% women, 86.5% men)
[2] 73.7% Vietnam	(69.1% women, 78.6% men)
[10] 61.0% Philippines	(49.9% women, 72.3% men)
[11] 55.1% Myanmar/Burma	(41.0% women, 69.7% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 338 738 K (42% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
South-Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 79.8% Cambodia	(73.7% women, 86.3% men)
[2] 72.6% Vietnam	(68.2% women, 77.4% men)
[10] 59.7% Philippines	(48.7% women, 70.9% men)
[11] 53.5% Myanmar/Burma	(39.4% women, 67.9% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
South-Eastern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 0.3% Cambodia	(0.3% women, 0.2% men)
[2] 0.7% Thailand	(0.7% women, 0.7% men)
[10] 3.8% Malaysia	(4.0% women, 3.7% men)
[11] 5.1% Brunei	(5.9% women, 4.7% men)

BRUNEI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CAMBODIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









INDONESIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









LAOS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MALAYSIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Sabah and Sarawak.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MYANMAR/BURMA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PHILIPPINES

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SINGAPORE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









THAILAND

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TIMOR-LESTE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









VIET NAM

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTHERN ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.5 Bhutan	[1] 83.4 Bhutan	[1] 1.53 Bhutan	[1] 0.6 Bhutan
[2] 2.0 Nepal	[2] 62.6 Maldives	[2] -0.37 India	[2] 0.5 India
[7] 2.7 Pakistan	[8] 6.6 Pakistan	[8] -1.15 Afghanistan	[8] -1.0 Iran
[8] 3.2 Afghanistan	[9] 1.4 Afghanistan	[9] -1.23 Iran	[9] -2.0 Afghanistan

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Bhutan	[1] 23 351 $ Maldives	[1] 19% Sri Lanka	[1] 6.9 Maldives
[2] 0.0% Maldives	[2] 16 224 $ Iran	[2] 22% Nepal	[2] 6.9 Sri Lanka
[7] 5.9% Bangladesh	[6] 5 531 $ Pakistan	[8] 45% Bhutan	[8] 61.3 Afghanistan
[8] 16.5% Pakistan	[7] 5 047 $ Nepal	[9] 78% Iran	[9] 64.6 Pakistan

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 18.2% Sri Lanka	[1] 5.8% Bhutan
[2] 19.6% Bhutan	[2] 5.2% Maldives
[8] 34.0% Pakistan	[8] 1.9% Pakistan
[9] 55.4% Afghanistan	[9] 1.8% Sri Lanka

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Southern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 64.9% Bhutan	(56.5% women, 72.2% men)
[2] 63.7% Maldives	(41.0% women, 76.4% men)
[8] 39.7% Nepal	(27.6% women, 53.7% men)
[9] 37.5% Afghanistan	(5.1% women, 69.9% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 764 284 K (28% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Southern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 63.1% Bhutan	(54.3% women, 70.6% men)
[2] 60.7% Maldives	(39.4% women, 72.7% men)
[8] 35.5% Nepal	(24.3% women, 48.4% men)
[9] 32.5% Afghanistan	(3.8% women, 61.2% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Southern Asian countries - 2024

[1] 2.9% Bhutan	(3.9% women, 2.2% men)
[2] 4.2% India	(4.4% women, 4.1% men)
[8] 10.7% Nepal	(12.3% women, 9.8% men)
[9] 13.3% Afghanistan	(25.6% women, 12.4% men)

AFGHANISTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BANGLADESH

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BHUTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









INDIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









IRAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MALDIVES

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NEPAL

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PAKISTAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SRI LANKA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









WESTERN ASIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.6 Qatar	[1] 84.4 Qatar	[1] 1.07 United Arab Emirates	[1] 1.6 United Arab Emirates
[2] 1.6 Kuwait	[2] 70.1 United Arab Emirates	[2] 0.83 Israel	[2] 1.2 Qatar
[15] 3.1 Syria	[15] 0.9 Yemen	[15] -1.65 Yemen	[15] -1.8 Syria
[16] 3.3 Yemen	[16] 0.0 Syria	[16] -1.75 Syria	[16] -2.3 Yemen

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.0% Azerbaijan	[1] 110 946 $ Qatar	[1] 40% Yemen	[1] 3.5 Israel
[2] 0.0% Qatar	[2] 68 585 $ United Arab Emirates	[2] 58% Azerbaijan	[2] 6.0 United Arab Emirates
[11] 16.5% Syria	[12] 9 520 $ Jordan	[15] 99% Qatar	[15] 24.9 Iraq
[12] 33.3% Yemen	[13] 3 846 $ Palestine	[16] 100% Kuwait	[16] 43.2 Yemen

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 3.6% Azerbaijan	[1] 6.4% Kuwait
[2] 5.7% Qatar	[2] 5.9% Israel
[14] 38.8% Syria	[14] 1.9% Bahrain
[15] 45.7% Yemen	[15] 1.2% Lebanon

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Western Asian countries - 2024

[1] 87.5% Qatar	(63.3% women, 95.6% men)
[2] 77.7% United Arab Emirates	(54.1% women, 89.6% men)
[13] 37.9% Syria	(13.3% women, 62.8% men)
[14] 32.8% Yemen	(4.9% women, 60.5% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 68 442 K (22% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Western Asian countries - 2024

[1] 87.4% Qatar	(63.1% women, 95.5% men)
[2] 76.1% United Arab Emirates	(51.7% women, 88.3% men)
[13] 31.5% Jordan	(10.2% women, 51.3% men)
[14] 27.2% Yemen	(3.5% women, 50.8% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Western Asian countries - 2024

[1] 0.1% Qatar	(0.4% women, 0.1% men)
[2] 1.1% Bahrain	(3.7% women, 0.4% men)
[13] 17.1% Yemen	(29.5% women, 16.1% men)
[14] 18.0% Jordan	(26.6% women, 16.2% men)

ARMENIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









AZERBAIJAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BAHRAIN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GEORGIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









IRAQ

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ISRAEL

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









JORDAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









KUWAIT

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









LEBANON

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE



DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

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MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PALESTINE**

**This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including East Jerusalem.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

QATAR

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SAUDI ARABIA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SYRIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



Working age population by education level

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LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









YEMEN

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MIGRATION IN **AMERICA**

AMERICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.4 Canada	[1] 97.6 Aruba	[1] 1.67 Canada	[1] 1.5 Canada
[2] 1.8 Uruguay	[2] 95.7 Dominica	[2] 1.57 Uruguay	[2] 1.2 United States
[24] 2.7 Colombia	[39] 12.3 Venezuela	[39] -1.44 Haiti	[39] -1.6 Venezuela
[25] 2.8 Haiti	[40] 10.4 Haiti	[40] -1.69 Venezuela	[40] -2.2 Haiti

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.1% Saint Lucia	[1] 105 323 $ Bermuda	[1] 19% Saint Lucia	[1] 5.1 Canada
[2] 0.2% Canada	[2] 75 492 $ United States	[2] 24% Antigua and Barbuda	[2] 6.5 United States
[25] 15.7% Honduras	[33] 6 586 $ Honduras	[41] 100% Bermuda	[33] 33.8 Dominican Republic
[26] 40.4% Haiti	[34] 2 801 $ Haiti	[42] 100% Cayman Islands	[34] 60.4 Haiti

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 9.2% Bolivia	[1] 14.7% American Samoa
[2] 11.1% Cuba	[2] 8.4% Cuba
[30] 34.4% Saint Lucia	[38] 1.0% Haiti
[31] 43.6% Guyana	[39] 0.0% Venezuela

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
American countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 78.7% Bolivia	(72.5% women, 85.0% men)
[2] 72.7% Peru	(65.2% women, 80.5% men)
[30] 52.2% Cuba	(39.5% women, 65.5% men)
[31] 49.6% Guyana	(40.3% women, 59.8% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 487 830 K (43% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
American countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 76.3% Bolivia	(69.9% women, 82.7% men)
[2] 69.2% Peru	(61.5% women, 77.2% men)
[30] 49.8% Venezuela	(35.4% women, 64.8% men)
[31] 44.6% Guyana	(35.5% women, 54.5% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
American countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 3.1% Cuba	(3.3% women, 2.9% men)
[2] 4.4% Guatemala	(5.7% women, 3.8% men)
[30] 30.1% Haiti	(36.4% women, 24.6% men)
[31] 36.1% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	(32.2% women, 38.9% men)

CARIBBEAN

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 2.0 Trinidad and Tobago	[1] 95.7 Dominica	[1] 1.34 Barbados	[1] 0.4 Jamaica
[2] 2.0 Jamaica	[2] 93.8 Barbados	[2] 1.27 Bahamas	[2] 0.4 Barbados
[4] 2.1 Cuba	[12] 53.6 Dominican Republic	[12] -0.45 Dominican Republic	[12] -0.5 Cuba
[5] 2.8 Haiti	[13] 10.4 Haiti	[13] -1.44 Haiti	[13] -2.2 Haiti

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 0.1% Saint Lucia	[1] 36 244 $ Bahamas	[1] 19% Saint Lucia	[1] 7.2 Cuba
[2] 0.8% Dominican Republic	[2] 31 690 $ Trinidad and Tobago	[2] 24% Antigua and Barbuda	[2] 10.1 Antigua and Barbuda
[5] 1.7% Barbados	[11] 10 260 $ Jamaica	[12] 84% Bahamas	[12] 33.8 Dominican Republic
[6] 40.4% Haiti	[12] 2 801 $ Haiti	[13] 85% Dominican Republic	[13] 60.4 Haiti

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 11.1% Cuba	[1] 8.4% Cuba
[2] 16.6% Trinidad and Tobago	[2] 6.5% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
[8] 28.6% Barbados	[12] 2.7% Bahamas
[9] 34.4% Saint Lucia	[13] 1.0% Haiti

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%] Caribbean countries - 2024

[1] 72.0% Bahamas	(66.5% women, 78.1% men)
[2] 69.1% Saint Lucia	(62.9% women, 75.6% men)
[8] 57.8% Trinidad and Tobago	(49.7% women, 66.1% men)
[9] 52.2% Cuba	(39.5% women, 65.5% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand] Overall: 18 076 K (42% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%] Caribbean countries - 2024

[1] 65.9% Bahamas	(61.1% women, 71.3% men)
[2] 64.7% Jamaica	(57.5% women, 72.2% men)
[8] 54.0% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	(46.8% women, 60.8% men)
[9] 51.4% Cuba	(38.9% women, 64.6% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%] Caribbean countries - 2024

[1] 1.5% Cuba	(1.6% women, 1.5% men)
[2] 4.5% Trinidad and Tobago	(5.2% women, 4.0% men)
[8] 15.1% Haiti	(18.2% women, 12.3% men)
[9] 18.1% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	(16.1% women, 19.4% men)

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

BAHAMAS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BARBADOS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CUBA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









DOMINICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

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DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GRENADA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

HAITI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









JAMAICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SAINT LUCIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CENTRAL AMERICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 1.8 Costa Rica	[1] 83.9 Costa Rica	[1] 0.65 Costa Rica	[1] 0.3 Costa Rica
[2] 2.0 Panama	[2] 65.4 Belize	[2] -0.23 Belize	[2] 0.1 El Salvador
[6] 2.3 Honduras	[7] 28.0 Honduras	[7] -1.12 Guatemala	[7] -0.9 Guatemala
[7] 2.7 Mexico	[8] 22.7 Mexico	[8] -1.39 Nicaragua	[8] -1.1 Nicaragua

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 1.0% Belize	[1] 36 426 $ Panama	[1] 47% Belize	[1] 9.4 Costa Rica
[2] 1.3% Costa Rica	[2] 26 973 $ Costa Rica	[2] 54% Guatemala	[2] 11.7 El Salvador
[7] 9.7% Guatemala	[7] 7 662 $ Nicaragua	[7] 82% Mexico	[7] 17.2 Honduras
[8] 15.7% Honduras	[8] 6 586 $ Honduras	[8] 83% Costa Rica	[8] 23.7 Guatemala

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 15.2% Panama	[1] 6.2% Costa Rica
[2] 16.4% Mexico	[2] 4.6% Belize
[7] 24.6% Belize	[7] 2.9% Nicaragua
[8] 30.3% Honduras	[8] 2.5% Panama

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Central American countries - 2024

[1] 65.4% Nicaragua	(50.1% women, 81.7% men)
[2] 65.0% Panama	(52.7% women, 77.6% men)
[7] 57.2% Honduras	(39.5% women, 74.9% men)
[8] 56.6% Costa Rica	(43.8% women, 69.9% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 79 798 K (39% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central American countries - 2024

[1] 62.5% Nicaragua	(47.7% women, 78.1% men)
[2] 60.8% Panama	(48.2% women, 73.6% men)
[7] 53.7% Honduras	(36.0% women, 71.5% men)
[8] 52.1% Costa Rica	(39.8% women, 65.0% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Central American countries - 2024

[1] 2.2% Guatemala	(2.9% women, 1.9% men)
[2] 2.7% Mexico	(2.7% women, 2.7% men)
[7] 7.0% Belize	(10.9% women, 4.5% men)
[8] 7.8% Costa Rica	(9.2% women, 7.0% men)

BELIZE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









COSTA RICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









EL SALVADOR

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



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

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



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Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

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Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GUATEMALA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









HONDURAS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MEXICO

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NICARAGUA

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PANAMA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NORTHERN AMERICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Northern American countries - 2024



Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 189 897 K (46% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Northern American countries - 2024



Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Northern American countries - 2024



CANADA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









UNITED STATES

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: For statistical purposes, the data for United States of America does not include US Territories and Freely Associated States.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOUTH AMERICA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
	[1] 1.8 Uruguay	[1] 82.0 Uruguay	[1] 1.57 Uruguay	[1] 0.9 Uruguay
	[2] 1.8 Argentina	[2] 59.7 Suriname	[2] 0.97 Chile	[2] 0.7 Chile
	[10] 2.6 Venezuela	[11] 19.0 Colombia	[11] -1.06 Paraguay	[11] -1.0 Suriname
	[11] 2.7 Colombia	[12] 12.3 Venezuela	[12] -1.69 Venezuela	[12] -1.6 Venezuela

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
	[1] 0.5% Chile	[1] 70 297 $ Guyana	[1] 27% Guyana	[1] 6.8 Chile
	[2] 1.0% Argentina	[2] 30 183 $ Chile	[2] 63% Paraguay	[2] 10.3 Argentina
	[9] 7.7% Colombia	[9] 13 936 $ Ecuador	[10] 89% Venezuela	[10] 25.7 Bolivia
	[10] 9.7% Venezuela	[10] 9 844 $ Bolivia	[11] 93% Argentina	[11] 28.4 Guyana

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 9.2% Bolivia	[1] 8.3% Bolivia
[2] 15.0% Argentina	[2] 5.9% Argentina
[11] 23.6% Venezuela	[10] 2.9% Suriname
[12] 43.6% Guyana	[11] 0.0% Venezuela

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
South American countries - 2024

[1] 78.7% Bolivia	(72.5% women, 85.0% men)
[2] 72.7% Peru	(65.2% women, 80.5% men)
[11] 52.6% Venezuela	(37.7% women, 68.4% men)
[12] 49.6% Guyana	(40.3% women, 59.8% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 200 060 K (42% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
South American countries - 2024

[1] 76.3% Bolivia	(69.9% women, 82.7% men)
[2] 69.2% Peru	(61.5% women, 77.2% men)
[11] 49.8% Venezuela	(35.4% women, 64.8% men)
[12] 44.6% Guyana	(35.5% women, 54.5% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
South American countries - 2024

[1] 3.1% Bolivia	(3.5% women, 2.7% men)
[2] 4.8% Ecuador	(5.7% women, 4.1% men)
[11] 9.6% Colombia	(12.0% women, 7.9% men)
[12] 10.2% Guyana	(11.8% women, 9.0% men)

ARGENTINA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BOLIVIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









BRAZIL

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









CHILE

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









COLOMBIA

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









ECUADOR

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









GUYANA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PARAGUAY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PERU

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SURINAME

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









URUGUAY

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









VENEZUELA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MIGRATION IN **OCEANIA**

OCEANIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
	[1] 1.3 New Zealand	[1] 96.2 New Zealand	[1] 2.08 New Zealand	[1] 1.6 Australia
	[2] 1.5 Australia	[2] 94.8 Cook Islands	[2] 1.78 Australia	[2] 1.5 New Zealand
	[3] 2.2 Papua New Guinea	[14] 60.7 Solomon Islands	[15] -0.31 Tonga	[15] -0.7 Solomon Islands
		[15] 27.0 Papua New Guinea	[16] -0.66 Papua New Guinea	[16] -0.8 Papua New Guinea

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
	[1] 0.4% Tonga	[1] 60 082 $ Australia	[1] 14% Papua New Guinea	[1] 3.8 Australia
	[2] 1.0% Australia	[2] 48 163 $ New Zealand	[2] 17% Samoa	[2] 5.0 New Zealand
	[11] 40.3% Solomon Islands	[10] 3 169 $ Vanuatu	[13] 87% New Zealand	[13] 44.5 Papua New Guinea
	[12] 52.2% Papua New Guinea	[11] 2 527 $ Solomon Islands	[14] 100% Nauru	[14] 58.6 Kiribati

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 8.2% Solomon Islands	[1] 16.4% Kiribati
[2] 8.7% Australia	[2] 12.8% Tuvalu
[7] 30.3% Samoa	[13] 3.5% Palau
[8] 34.7% Vanuatu	[14] 0.8% Papua New Guinea

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Oceanian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 84.4% Solomon Islands	(82.4% women, 86.2% men)
[2] 71.5% New Zealand	(66.9% women, 76.1% men)
[7] 51.7% Tonga	(41.7% women, 64.0% men)
[8] 42.7% Samoa	(30.6% women, 54.9% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 21 613 K (47% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Oceanian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 83.1% Solomon Islands	(81.2% women, 85.0% men)
[2] 68.0% New Zealand	(63.5% women, 72.6% men)
[7] 50.6% Tonga	(40.6% women, 62.9% men)
[8] 40.7% Samoa	(28.4% women, 53.2% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Oceanian countries top & bottom - 2024

[1] 2.9% Solomon Islands	(3.1% women, 2.8% men)
[2] 4.4% Tonga	(5.6% women, 3.4% men)
[7] 9.7% New Zealand	(10.2% women, 9.3% men)
[8] 10.1% Vanuatu	(12.7% women, 7.9% men)

AUSTRALIA / NEW ZEALAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Australia & New Zealand - 2024



Employment 2023 by economic sec
Overall: 16 856 K (47% a



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Australia & New Zealand - 2024



Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Australia & New Zealand - 2024



AUSTRALIA



DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Norfolk Island.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









NEW ZEALAND



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: For statistical purposes, data for New Zealand does not include Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MELANESIA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
[1] 2.2 Papua New Guinea	[1] 81.0 Vanuatu	[1] 0.51 Fiji	[1] 0.5 Fiji
	[2] 73.0 Fiji	[2] -0.01 Vanuatu	[2] -0.6 Vanuatu
	[3] 60.7 Solomon Islands	[3] -0.13 Solomon Islands	[3] -0.7 Solomon Islands
	[4] 27.0 Papua New Guinea	[4] -0.66 Papua New Guinea	[4] -0.8 Papua New Guinea

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 4.7% Fiji	[1] 14 104 $ Fiji	[1] 14% Papua New Guinea	[1] 17.7 Vanuatu
[2] 19.5% Vanuatu	[2] 4 301 $ Papua New Guinea	[2] 26% Vanuatu	[2] 22.4 Solomon Islands
[3] 40.3% Solomon Islands	[3] 3 169 $ Vanuatu	[3] 26% Solomon Islands	[3] 27.2 Fiji
[4] 52.2% Papua New Guinea	[4] 2 527 $ Solomon Islands	[4] 59% Fiji	[4] 44.5 Papua New Guinea

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
[1] 8.2% Solomon Islands	[1] 8.3% Solomon Islands
[2] 19.5% Fiji	[2] 7.6% Vanuatu
[3] 27.8% Papua New Guinea	[3] 4.2% Fiji
[4] 34.7% Vanuatu	[4] 0.8% Papua New Guinea

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Melanesian countries - 2024

[1] 84.4% Solomon Islands	(82.4% women, 86.2% men)
[2] 58.4% Vanuatu	(53.7% women, 63.1% men)
[3] 57.3% Fiji	(38.5% women, 76.7% men)
[4] 52.0% Papua New Guinea	(50.7% women, 53.3% men)

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 4 490 K (47% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Melanesian countries - 2024

[1] 83.1% Solomon Islands	(81.2% women, 85.0% men)
[2] 55.4% Vanuatu	(50.3% women, 60.6% men)
[3] 54.8% Fiji	(36.4% women, 73.9% men)
[4] 50.6% Papua New Guinea	(49.5% women, 51.6% men)

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Melanesian countries - 2024

[1] 1.5% Solomon Islands	(1.5% women, 1.4% men)
[2] 2.7% Papua New Guinea	(2.2% women, 3.2% men)
[3] 4.3% Fiji	(5.5% women, 3.7% men)
[4] 5.1% Vanuatu	(6.3% women, 4.0% men)

FIJI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









PAPUA NEW GUINEA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









SOLOMON

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









VANUATU



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









MICRONESIA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

top & bottom countries

Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
N/A	[1] 93.4 Marshall Islands	[1] 0.78 Federated States of Micronesia	[1] 0.4 Palau
	[2] 91.0 Kiribati	[2] 0.59 Nauru	[2] 0.2 Federated States of Micronesia
	[4] 89.6 Palau	[4] 0.41 Kiribati	[4] -0.1 Nauru
	[5] 82.9 Nauru	[5] 0.41 Marshall Islands	[5] -0.1 Kiribati

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

top & bottom countries

Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
[1] 2.1% Marshall Islands	[1] 12 604 $ Nauru	[1] 24% Federated States of Micronesia	[1] 11.1 Nauru
[2] 6.1% Kiribati	[2] 7 212 $ Marshall Islands	[2] 58% Kiribati	[2] 23.3 Palau
[3] 9.7% Nauru	[3] 3 824 $ Federated States of Micronesia	[4] 83% Palau	[4] 31.0 Marshall Islands
[4] 26.1% Federated States of Micronesia	[4] 3 257 $ Kiribati	[5] 100% Nauru	[5] 58.6 Kiribati

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]	Working age population by education level
N/A	[1] 16.4% Kiribati	
	[2] 11.6% Federated States of Micronesia	
	[4] 5.7% Nauru	
	[5] 3.5% Palau	



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 73 K (45% are women)



DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

KIRIBATI

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)





RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)





NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

MARSHALL ISLANDS

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

MICRONESIA (FEDERAL STATE OF)

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

NAURU

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 12

Population change (2024-2050) +31.9%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications

2021	0
2022	0
2023	0
2024	0

M F unknown

First instance decisions

2021	0
2022	0
2023	0
2024	0

Geneva Subsid. Human. Reject. unknown

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



Work Family Educat. Other Long term

NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
2023	0

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

2021	0	0	N/A
2022	0	0	N/A
2023	0	0	N/A
2024	0	0	N/A

Ordered to leave Returned #% Return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

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DATA NOT AVAILABLE

PALAU

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Population (2024) 18



Population change (2024-2050) -12.3%

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications

2021	0
2022	0
2023	0
2024	0

M F unknown

First instance decisions

2021	0
2022	0
2023	0
2024	0

Geneva Subsid. Human. Reject. unknown

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



Work Family Educat. Other Long term

NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
2023	0

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

2021	0	0	N/A
2022	0	0	N/A
2023	0	0	N/A
2024	0	0	N/A

Ordered to leave Returned #% Return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

POLYNESIA



MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



NOTE: Including Pitcairn.

MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

	Global Peace Index	Political stability	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness
top countries	N/A	[1] 94.8 Cook Islands	[1] 0.73 Samoa	[1] 0.5 Samoa
		[2] 94.3 Tuvalu	[2] 0.65 Tuvalu	[2] -0.1 Tonga
bottom countries		[3] 90.5 Samoa	[3] 0.03 Cook Islands	[3] -0.1 Cook Islands
		[4] 90.0 Tonga	[4] -0.31 Tonga	[4] -0.4 Tuvalu

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Remittances, Hum Aid +ODA, and Net FDIs [% of GDP]



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

	Below intern. poverty line	GDP per capita (PPP)	Urban population	Under 5 mort. rate
top countries	[1] 0.4% Tonga	[1] 6 895 $ Samoa	[1] 17% Samoa	[1] 10.8 Tonga
	[2] 4.5% Samoa		[2] 23% Tonga	[2] 17.0 Samoa
bottom countries	[3] 9.0% Tuvalu		[3] 67% Tuvalu	[3] 21.9 Tuvalu

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

	NEETs [%]	Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]
top countries	[1] 28.5% Tonga	[1] 12.8% Tuvalu
	[2] 30.3% Samoa	[2] 5.5% Samoa
bottom countries		[3] 5.3% Tonga

Working age population by education level



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Labour force participation (15 years and older) [%]
Polynesian countries - 2024

[1] 51.7%	Tonga	(41.7% women, 64.0% men)	
[2] 42.7%	Samoa	(30.6% women, 54.9% men)	

Employment 2023 by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Overall: 194 K (41% are women)



Employment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Polynesian countries - 2024

[1] 50.6%	Tonga	(40.6% women, 62.9% men)	
[2] 40.7%	Samoa	(28.4% women, 53.2% men)	

Unemployment rate (15 years and older) [%]
Polynesian countries - 2024

[1] 2.2%	Tonga	(2.8% women, 1.7% men)	
[2] 4.6%	Samoa	(7.1% women, 3.1% men)	

COOK ISLAND

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
2023	0

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate

2021	0	0	N/A
2022	0	0	N/A
2023	0	0	N/A
2024	0	0	N/A

Ordered to leave Returned #% Return rate

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)

Global Peace Index

N/A

Political stability

94.8 (2023)



Control of Corruption

0.0 (2023)



Government Effectiveness

-0.1 (2023)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)

Below intern. poverty line

N/A

GDP per capita (PPP)

N/A

Urban population

N/A

Under 5 mort. rate

N/A

EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)

NEETs [%]

N/A

Govern. expend. in educat. [%GDP]

N/A

Working age population by education level

WAP: 12K (2023)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

SAMOA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)

Migrant population within and outside the country/territory



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Refugees from/within the country/territory & IDPs (2024)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First time applications



First instance decisions

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)

First residence permits issued during the year



Valid residence permits at the end of the year



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Nationals who have acquired citizenship of a EU Member State

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

Persons ordered to leave, persons returned and return rate



POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TONGA

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)



ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)









TUVALU

MAP AND FLAG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY [in thousand] (UNDESA)



MIGRATION [in thousand] (UNDESA)



REFUGEES AND IDPs (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

ASYLUM IN THE EU (Eurostat)



RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (Eurostat)



NATURALISATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)



IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (Eurostat)

POLITICAL (World Bank, Inst. for Economics and Peace)



FINANCIAL INFLOWS (World Bank, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)



SOCIAL CONDITIONS (World Bank)



EDUCATION (World Bank, ILO)



LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

TECHNICAL NOTES

DEMOGRAPHY [IN THOUSAND] (UN DESA)

Indicator: Total population, demographic pyramid and population change
Source of data: UN DESA World Population Prospect 2024: Standard Projections, Population – medium variant, annual, from 1950 to 2100 (total, female, male)
Description: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population in a country/territory, area or region as of 1st July of the year indicated. It comprises total population, as well as female and male population, and it is presented in thousands. The population change between the reference year and 2050 is calculate by KCMD on projections in the "Medium Fertility Variant" scenario.
Note: Data on Kosovo is provided separately and not included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source. Data on China do not include Hong Kong and Macao, which are presented separately by the source.
Link: https://population.un.org/wpp/
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/07/2025).

MIGRATION [IN THOUSAND] (UN DESA)

Indicators: Migrant population within and outside the country/territory
Source of data: UN DESA Population Division. International Migrant Stock 2024 (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2024)
Description: International migrant stock at mid-year (both sexes) by origin and by major area, region, country/territory or area of destination.
Note: In principle, refugees (under UNHCR and, when relevant, UNRWA) are included in the number of migrants. However, it should be noted that inconsistencies might arise when comparing the number of migrants reported by UN DESA with the number of refugees reported by UNHCR or by UNRWA. This is mostly due to differences (definitions, reference period and methodologies) in data collections.
Data on Kosovo are included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source. Data on China do not include Hong Kong and Macao that are presented separately by the source.
Link: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update28/01/2025)

REFUGEES AND IDPS (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC)

Data on Palestine refugees under the mandate of UNRWA has been added to UNHCR data. UNRWA operates in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

Indicator: Refugees
Source of data: UNHCR - Refugee Population Statistics Database
Description: Refugees and people in 'refugee-like situations' by origin, end of the year.
Note: According to UNHCR: "Refugees include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation" (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/). According to the UNHCR glossary: "The category of people in a refugee-like situation is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their country of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained." (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/methodology/definition/). Data on Kosovo are included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source. Data includes Palestine refugees under the mandate of UNRWA.
Link: https://popstats.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 12/06/2025)

Indicator: IDPs
Source of data: IDMC - Global Internal Displacement Database
Description: Total number of Internally Displaced Persons (conflict and violence) at the end of the year.

Note: Data on Kosovo is provided separately and not included in Serbia. This is without prejudice to positions on status and reflects data in the original source. Data on China do not include Hong Kong and Macao that are presented separately by the source.
Link: https://www.internal-displacement.org/database
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 13/05/2025)

ASYLUM IN THE EU [1ST INSTANCE] (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: First time applications
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_asyappctza
Description: Asylum applicants by type of applicant, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data. Note: First-time asylum applicants are people who lodged an application for asylum for the first time in a given Member State during the reference period. The term 'first-time' implies no time limitation and therefore a person can be recorded as first-time applicant only if he or she had never applied for international protection in the reporting country in the past, irrespective of whether they are found to have applied in another Member State of the European Union.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asyappctza/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 01/09/2025)

Indicator: First instance decisions by outcome
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_asydcfsta
Description: First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data.
Note: First instance decision means a decision granted by the respective authority acting as a first instance of the administrative asylum procedure in the receiving country
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asydcfsta/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (last update 28/08/2025)

RESIDENCE PERMITS IN THE EU (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: First residence permits issued during the year
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_resfirst
Description: First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship.
Note: Any authorisation issued to a person for the first time by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third country national to stay legally on its territory. The dataset is disaggregated by the following groups of reasons: Remunerated activities (referred to as 'Work'), Family, Education and Other. The group 'Other' includes Refugee status and subsidiary protection; Humanitarian reasons; Residence only; Unaccompanied minors; Victims of trafficking in human beings; and Other reasons not specified. For further information, the reader can refer to the specific dataset from Eurostat (migr_resoth: 'First permits issued for other reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship').
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resfirst/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 29/10/2025)

Indicator: Valid permits (stock) – Valid permits at the end of the year (by reason)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_resvalid
Description: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year.
Note: The dataset includes the same four groups of reasons as the First residence permits dataset, as well as two additional groups: Refugee status and Subsidiary protection. For consistency in the data presentation, these two have been aggregated into the group 'Other'.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resvalid/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Valid permits (stock) – Valid long-term permits at the end of the year
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_reslong
Description: Long-term residents by citizenship on 31 December of each year.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_reslong/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

NATURALISATION IN THE EU (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Nationals who have acquired citizenship of an EU Member State
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_acq
Description: Acquisition of citizenship by age group, sex and former citizenship.
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_acq/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 05/05/2025)

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EU (EUROSTAT)

Indicator: Ordered to leave
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_eiord
Description: Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eiord/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Returned (to a third country following an order to leave)
Source of data: Eurostat - migr_eirtn
Description: Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded).
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eirtn/default/table?lang=en
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 19/11/2025)

Indicator: Return rate
Note: The Return rate is calculated by JRC as the ratio between Returned and Ordered to leave.

POLITICAL (WORLD BANK, INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE)

Indicator: Global Peace Index (GPI)
Source of data: Vision of Humanity (by the Institute for Economics and Peace)
Description: GPI shows the relative peacefulness of states and territories according to multiple variables. GPI values range from 1 (most peaceful) to 5 (least peaceful).
It ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. It covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflicts; and the degree of Militarisation.
Link: https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 30/06/2025)

Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WGI - PV.PER.RNK
Description: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Percentile rank indicates the country country/territory's rank among all countries /territories covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank (least stable), and 100 to highest rank (most stable).
Link: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=PV.PER.RNK
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 05/11/2024)

Indicator: Control of Corruption
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WGI – CC.EST
Description: Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. The value goes from 2.5 (very low corruption) to -2.5 (very high corruption).
Link: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=CC.EST
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 05/11/2024)

Indicator: Government Effectiveness

Source of data: WORLD BANK – WGI – GE.EST
Description: Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public and civil services, the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The value goes from -2.5 (very low effectiveness) to 2.5 (very high effectiveness).
Link: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=GE.EST
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 05/11/2024)

FINANCIAL INFLOWS (WORLD BANK, UNOCHA, OECD, UNCTAD)

Indicator: International remittances inflow [as % of GDP]
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI – BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS
Description: Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees.
Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 15/04/2025)

Indicator: Official Development Assistance (ODA) [as % of GDP]
Source of data: OECD - Creditor Reporting System (CRS)
Description: The values are relative to the total (all types) ODA from EU institutions, through all channels. They represent gross disbursements and are relative to the current prices. They are added to Humanitarian aid contributions and shown as % of the GDP.
Link: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 11/04/2024)

Indicator: Humanitarian aid contributions [as % of GDP]
Source of data: UNOCHA - Financial Tracking Service (FTS)
Description: The values are relative to the total humanitarian aid to the given country/territory. They represent gross disbursements and are relative to the current prices. They are added to Official Development Assistance and shown as % of the GDP.
Link: https://fts.unocha.org/
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 21/04/2024)

Indicator: Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow [as % of GDP]
Source of data: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment
Description: FDI net inflows are the value of inward direct investment made by non-resident investors in the country/territory including reinvested earnings and intra-company loans, net of repatriation of capital and repayment of loans.
Link: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 01/09/2025)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS (WORLD BANK)

Indicator: Below international poverty line at $2.15 (as % of total population)
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI - SI.POV.DDAY
Description: Below international poverty line shows the proportion of the country/territory's population which lives on less than USD 2.15 per day. Poverty headcount ratio at $2.15 a day (2017 PPP) (as % of population).
Link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SI.POV.DDAY
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (last update 15/04/2025)

Indicator: GDP per capita (ppp)
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI - NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD
Description: the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is an indicator of economic standing, showing a country/territory's economic output (in USD) per inhabitant. It is converted to international dollars (at its constant 2017 international value) using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates and divided by total population.
Link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 15/04/2025)

Indicator: Urban population (as % of total population)
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI - SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS
Description: Urban population shows the proportion of the country/territory's population which resides in urban areas.
It is calculated using population estimates from UN Population Division and urban ratios from the UN World Urbanization Prospects.
Link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 15/04/2025)

Indicator: Under-5 mortality rate (per 1 000 live births)
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI - SH.DYN.MORT
Description: Under 5 mortality rate is the probability per 1 000 people born that a new-born baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year.
Link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SH.DYN.MORT
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 15/04/2025)

EDUCATION (WORLD BANK, ILO)

Indicator: NEETs
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – EIP_NEET_SEX_RT
Description: NEETs presents the share of young people who are neither in education and training nor in employment, as a percentage of the total number of young people in the corresponding age group.
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Government expenditures in education, total [as % of GDP]
Source of data: WORLD BANK – WDI – SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS
Description: Government expenditures in education show total general (local, regional and central) government expenditure on education (current, capital, and transfers), expressed as a percentage of GDP. It includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to the government.
Link: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series= SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 15/04/2025)

Indicator: Working-age population by sex and education
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – POP_XWAP_SEX_AGE_EDU_NB_A
Description: Working-age population by sex and education shows the distribution (%) by the level of education (less than basic, basic, intermediate, advanced) for men and women. Working age is commonly defined as persons aged 15 years and older, but this varies from country to country. In addition to using a minimum age threshold, certain countries also apply a maximum age limit. For each country/territory, the working age population is shown at the top of the chart, expressed in thousand people.
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

LABOUR MARKET (ILO)

Indicator: Labour force participation rate by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT
Description: Labour force participation by sex and age group shows a proportion (%) of the population that engages actively in the labour market (working or looking for work) relative to the population at working age. The figures are modelled estimates and are reported at the aggregate level (above the chart), and disaggregated by age group (total, 15-24, 25-54 and 55+) and sex (men and women)..
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Employment by economic sector and sex [thousand]
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – EMP_2EMP_SEX_ECO_NB
Description: Employment by sex and economic activity shows all persons (thousands) of working age who were in paid employment or self-employment. The figures are modelled estimates and are reported at the aggregate level (above the chart), by sex (men and women) and economic activity (total, services, industry, agriculture).
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Employment rate by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – EMP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT
Description: Employment rate by sex and age group shows the proportion (%) of employed among working age population. The figures are modelled estimates and are reported at the aggregate level (above the chart), by age group (15-24 and 25+) and sex (men and women).
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

Indicator: Unemployment rate by age group and sex [%]
Source of data: International Labour Organization (ILO) – UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT
Description: Unemployment rate by sex and age group shows the number of persons who are unemployed as a percent of the total number of employed and unemployed persons. The figures are modelled estimates and are reported at the aggregate level (above the chart), and disaggregated by age groups (15-24 and 25+) and sex (men and women).
Link: https://rplumber.ilo.org/files/website/bulk/indicator.html
Date of consultation: 23/11/2025 (source last update 14/11/2025)

GENERAL NOTES

- Maps are for illustrative purposes only and do not imply any political positions on borders and disputed territories.
- Wherever not otherwise specified, the 2020 composition of the European Union is considered.
- The grouping of non-EU countries and territories by continent and subcontinent is based on geographical criteria only and does not have any political implications. For this exercise, we have followed the ESTAT GEO (Geopolitical entities reporting) code and the ESTAT Reference And Management Of Nomenclatures (RAMON) list which provide geographical entities for statistical purposes at the aggregate-level of countries, regions and organisations.
- The designation of 'Palestine' shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
- The designation of 'Kosovo' is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
- UNDESA, UNHCR and Eurostat provide separate data on Morocco and the "non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara". As the EU does not officially recognise the "non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara", the relative profile is not included in this Atlas.
- Differently from all the other sources, UN provides separate data for most of the dependent territories (such as overseas territories or departments, unincorporated territories, etc.). UNDESA or UNHCR data relative to these dependent territories are not included in the country on which they depend.

CONFLICT-RELATED DISPLACEMENT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DRIVERS, DYNAMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS



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1. INTRODUCTION

The number of forcibly displaced people has risen sharply in the past 15 years. According to the United Nations, over 51 million people were in need of international protection at the end of 2024.

The number of armed conflicts has also increased, reaching over 180 in 2024. This chapter contributes to shedding light on the dynamics of conflict-related displacement. It does so by analysing the diverse impacts that conflict situations produce on displacement across different geographical contexts. It considers the interaction between a multiplicity of displacement, conflict and contextual characteristics and factors.

Large scale displacement situations at the global level - including in Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Sudan, Ukraine and Venezuela - differ across multiple dimensions - from the proportion of internal and external displacement relative to population or one another to the evolution of displacement patterns over time [1]. As underlined by existing studies, achieving a more granular understanding of the dynamics of conflict, its geographical scope within the country or region, its intensity and the actors involved (e.g. state or non-state actors) is a precondition for developing a more accurate analysis of displacement patterns. In parallel, it is also central to better conceptualising the relationship between conflict and contextual factors – demographic, socio-economic, environmental, institutional and policy-related – that play a role in how and to what extent conflict leads to displacement [2].

Displacement and conflict are often rooted in—and exacerbate—state fragility. Both phenomena intersect across multiple dimensions of fragility: forced displacement has societal, environmental and security implications, while conflict manifests through human casualties, infrastructure destruction and institutional breakdown. The OECD Fragility Framework captures these interconnections, recognising that addressing displacement and conflict requires understanding their multidimensional nature and their role in both reflecting and deepening state fragility [3].

Figure 1. Number of refugees, people in a refugee-like situations, Venezuelans displaced abroad and asylum seekers since 1990. Source: JRC elaboration on UNHR and UNRWA data



A better understanding of the dynamics and circumstances triggering large scale displacement can support EU policy responses across several domains. Improving the depth of our understanding of conflict and displacement factors and the dynamics through which they play out in various contexts is key to supporting situational awareness, early warning, anticipation and preparedness actions. These efforts cut across foreign policy, humanitarian and development cooperation, and migration and asylum management [4].

The first part of this chapter focuses on unpacking the relationship between conflict and displacement. It considers evidence produced by academia and international and civil society organisations and discusses prevailing methodological approaches and data sources applied to different conflict dimensions (scale, intensity, nature and actors involved), as well as a set of concurring drivers that impact on the way in which conflict produce displacement.

The second part presents the main findings from the comparative analysis of six case studies: **Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Sudan, Ukraine and Venezuela**, selected based on conflict severity, the scale of displacement, geographic diversity and relevance to the EU. The more detailed description of analytical dimensions can be found in the annex. The analysis is mostly descriptive and provides an indication of existing displacement patterns in different conflict situations.

The third part concludes by mentioning implications for policy and the identified fields for additional research.

BOX 1. Displacement terminology

Displacement

Displacement refers to situations in which people are forced to leave their habitual place of residence, typically as a result of conflict, persecution, violence or disasters. It can occur within a country's borders (internal displacement) or across an international border (international displacement) [5]. This chapter uses the term displacement to encompass this broader set of mobilities.

International displacement encompasses several groups under distinct legal and institutional frameworks: refugees protected as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol under UNHCR's mandate; Palestine refugees under the mandate of UNRWA; Venezuelans displaced abroad, often covered by complementary or temporary protection mechanisms; and asylum seekers and others of concern to UNHCR whose status is still being determined.

Internal displacement

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people forced to flee their homes because of conflict, violence or disasters, but who remain within their country's borders. The main international reference is the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a non- binding UN document widely used in law and policy [6]. The Principles place primary responsibility on national authorities to prevent displacement, protect and assist IDPs, and support durable solutions such as voluntary return, local integration or resettlement. If authorities are unable or unwilling to do so, humanitarian organisations may provide assistance. Regionally, the African Union's Kampala Convention is the only binding treaty specifically addressing IDPs. Reliable global data on internal displacement is produced by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which has systematically tracked IDP numbers for roughly the past decade. In 2024, IDMC estimated around 83 million people living in internal displacement [7]. While IDPs often face severe humanitarian conditions and their numbers far exceed those displaced across borders, internal displacement crises tend to receive less international visibility.

Refugees

"Refugee" is defined in international law, primarily by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which together establish the core legal framework (UN General Assembly 1951; 1967) [8], [9]., According to the Convention, a refugee is:

"A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

The 1967 Protocol later universalised this definition by removing the original geographic and temporal restrictions that had limited it to events in Europe before 1951.

The Convention codifies key principles like *non-refoulement*, which prohibits returning refugees to places where their life or freedom would be threatened [10]. Nearly 150 States are parties to these instruments, and most countries have established procedures to recognise some form of protection in line with this definition (see figure below).
Over time, some regions have expanded the definition – for example, the 1969 OAU (Organization of African Unity – now the African Union) Convention in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration in Latin America include people fleeing generalised violence or mass human rights violations. In practice, recognition rates and procedures vary by country: some conduct individualised refugee status determination, while others grant *prima facie* refugee status to groups from certain conflict areas. People who have applied for asylum but whose claims have not yet been assessed are asylum seekers.

Palestinian refugees

Almost no Palestinian refugees benefit from UNHCR protection. Instead, they are guaranteed protection by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). "Palestine refugees" is a distinct legal concept covering those displaced in 1948, when Israel was founded, as well as during the war of 1967 [11], [12]. The descendants of Palestine refugees inherit the Palestine refugee status absent a durable solution.

This population today numbers about 5.9 million across UNRWA's areas of operation – Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria [13]. Indeed, many Palestine refugees reside in Palestine itself; for example, it is estimated that about 67% of the population of Gaza is made up of Palestine refugees that have fled their homes in nowadays Israel [14]. They remain recognised as refugees due to the unresolved right of return to their former properties since they are not allowed entry within what is now Israel.

Others in need of international protection or in refugee-like situations

These operational categories refer to individuals who face similar risks and protection needs to refugees but lack formal Convention-refugee status, often because they receive protection under national temporary schemes, are part of large mixed flows or remain unprocessed [15]. For example, during the Syrian refugee influx, neighbouring countries in the Middle East often did not formally recognise Syrians as refugees under the Convention, but provided alternative protection statuses (temporary protection or humanitarian stay visas) giving them refuge and basic rights. This category enables organisations like UNHCR to monitor and assist persons whose legal status is ambiguous but whose vulnerabilities are comparable to those of convention refugees. In the EU, the Temporary Protection Directive was activated in 2022 for Ukrainians - for the first time ever - , offering immediate protection without case-by-case asylum processing [16]. The Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary protection is defined by the European Migration Network as "an exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection to displaced persons from non-EU countries."

Venezuelans displaced abroad

By the end of 2024, over 7 million Venezuelans had fled their country due to its dire economic and political situation [17]. Many of these individuals are in a refugee-like situation but are not formally classified as refugees - they fall under UNHCR's "Others in need of international protection." Latin American governments have generally not conducted refugee status determinations at scale for Venezuelans, even though the Cartagena Declaration's broadened refugee definition could apply to people fleeing generalised violence and public order disruptions [18], [19]. Instead, most Venezuelan nationals abroad have been managed under migratory frameworks or ad-hoc temporary protection measures, often to allow legal stay and access to basic rights without invoking formal asylum processes. Colombia, Peru and others created special temporary residency permits for Venezuelans. UNHCR nevertheless considers Venezuelans outside their country to be persons "in need of international protection" - a recognition of the coercive push factors driving their exodus [20]. Since 2019 UNHCR has used the category "Venezuelans displaced abroad" to count those who had fled but not applied for asylum, indicating that they should receive protection even if not formally refugees [21].

BOX 2. Displacement categories and their limits

Legal status categories can at times create false homogeneity within groups or arbitrary distinctions between them. In Venezuela, only 400 000 of 7.6 million displaced people received formal UNHCR refugee recognition due to many Latin American countries' use of local or regional permit systems. In Myanmar, millions are displaced across borders - particularly in Thailand - who could qualify as refugees but lack formal recognition and thus fall outside formal UNHCR refugee statistics. IDP undercounting (as in Venezuela where data is inconsistent or lacking) or differential measurement standards can distort cross-country comparisons. Whether displacement appears as "internal" or "international" depends not only on where people move, but also on which legal and administrative systems recognise and count them.

2. GLOBAL SNAPSHOT OF

Figure 2. Snapshot of some of the largest conflict and displacement situations worldwide, 2024 data.



CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT

Source: JRC elaboration on UNHCR, UNRWA and IDMC data.











3. EXISTING EVIDENCE, FRAMEWORKS AND DATA

Evidence from conflict and displacement emphasises how conflict-related factors interact with each other in complex ways, rather than working in isolation from one another. Different combinations of factors produce different outcomes depending on the specific context. For example, infrastructure damage alone may not trigger migration unless people believe conditions will not improve. In other words, a single factor may only trigger displacement when compounded by others or when prolonged past a certain threshold [22]. Factors need to be adjusted to local circumstances and expected outcomes to be adapted based on specific characteristics present in each situation [23]. More granular or disaggregated data can help reveal important patterns, such as who leaves, who stays, and how long it takes for people to decide to flee - as, for example, even prolonged conflicts can generate relatively few refugees, if their direct impact on individuals remains limited [24]. The figure below outlines some of the factors and characteristics that recurrently emerge in the literature as shaping various outcomes of conflict and displacement. These national cases - elaborated upon in the Annex - highlight the interactive dynamics between conflict, displacement and contextual characteristics and factors that this figure outlines.

Figure 3. Overview of selected conflict, displacement and contextual factors and characteristics



REVEALING COMPLEXITY BEYOND SIMPLE TYPOLOGIES

Research points to the need to avoid simple *'either/or'* categories - *conflict vs. no conflict, forced vs. voluntary migration, state vs. non-state actors* [25]. Oversimplified distinctions can obscure the complex ways in which conflict and mobility intersect across various types and degrees of governance, coercion, and choice. More disaggregated typologies of conflict are needed to capture the peculiarities of different types of violence and their respective effects. Precursors to conflict, such as state fragility, can be essential pieces to the puzzle of contextual factors that shape conflict-related displacement [26].

Migration cannot be neatly categorised as forced when conflict is present and voluntary when conflict is not present [27]. Voluntariness - the desire and capacity to move - has to be evaluated relative to available alternatives - someone who stays in a conflict zone because they cannot afford to leave is making a different kind of "choice", than someone who stays because they have secure shelter and employment. Simple binaries therefore do not capture the contextual factors behind decisions influenced by individual capabilities, perceptions, and constraints.

In terms of actor typologies, a variety of cases from North Africa to West Asia, demonstrate how armed actors can behave in ways very similar to states. Non-state actors can act as "hybrid authorities" that do things like delivering goods and services and operate in conjunction with the state along various degrees. Co-governance across such actors might be difficult to capture and easy to misrepresent through neat conflict actor typologies [28].

THE ROLE OF CAPABILITIES AND ASPIRATIONS

Understanding why people move or stay under conflict requires attention to how individuals assess threats, weigh options, and navigate constraints within specific circumstances. The capabilities-aspirations framework, refined by Hein de Haas and Jørgen Carling as a theoretical lens for understanding migration more broadly, offers a productive framework that can be applied to the analysis of conflict displacement. The framework posits that migration decisions derive not from a single driver, but from the intersection of factors emerging from two dimensions: capabilities - the material and practical ability to move - and aspirations - the willingness or desire to do so within given conditions[1] [29].

The framework recognises migration as a choice embedded in structural constraints. Two individuals facing identical violence or economic hardship may move, stay, or move in different ways depending on their capabilities and aspirations - that is, on what they are materially able to do and what they aspire to achieve. This heterogeneity cannot be explained by single factors, such as violence intensity or economic desperation alone. A capabilities-aspirations lens can therefore offer a corrective to analyses that assume all conflict exposure produces displacement or that displacement reflects a uniform desire (or ability) to move. Instead, it highlights how:

1. **Capabilities** encompass factors like access to money, networks, documents, transport, safe routes, information, and even physical ability to move. In conflict settings, capabilities also include the absence of barriers - access to open borders, absence of militarised checkpoints, or functioning transport infrastructure.

2. **Aspirations** include the desire to escape violence but also perceptions of opportunities elsewhere, expectations about protection or livelihood prospects at origin or in potential destinations, family obligations, social norms about mobility or staying, and individual or household risk tolerance. Aspirations are shaped by information (accurate or otherwise), perceptions, social networks, and prior experience and memories.

These dimensions are not static or independent; they interact dynamically with contextual factors and individual circumstances.

1 The capabilities-aspirations framework emerged from migration scholarship as a response to deterministic approaches that treated migration as a mechanical outcome of push-pull factors, such as economic differentials. It draws on Amartya Sen's broader concept of 'human capabilities and freedom.

BOX 3. Who stays behind?

Not all those at risk can or wish to move. "Trapped populations" include those immobilised by poverty, age, or closed borders. Others stay deliberately, maintaining property, awaiting return, or relying on networks and remittances for support. When the methods that sustain entrapment are relaxed - such as the reopening of severed escape routes - sudden spikes in migration may be triggered. Recognising immobility as an outcome is essential for protection planning [30].

BOX 4. Perceptions, proxies, realities

Perceived safety often outweighs objective risk. A study of ten local areas across Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia found that fearing violence - even if not directly experienced - is a statistically significant driver of migration - "sometimes even more than actual experiences" [31]. Fears, attitudes, and perceptions can be measured through surveys, but they can also be measured and quantified through proxies. Safety perceptions, for example, can be based on risks households assess in relation to their socioeconomic circumstances. Violent acts suffered by family members and friends or the presence of hostile forces in the region can also serve as proxies for perceptions of safety [32].

SCALE AND GRANULARITY OF ANALYSIS

The reliance on national data is a recurrent methodological limitation present in current research and analysis. Violence is local, and country-level statistics can mask important local variation [33]. Event-based datasets like Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program- Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED) have begun addressing this gap by providing georeferenced data on precise locations, dates, violence types, fatalities and actor involvement. This represents a significant methodological advance, enabling analysts to capture conflict intensity, duration, geographic diffusion and proximity to population in disaggregated forms. ACLED collects real-time data on political violence and protest events, recording event types and sub-types across the world [34]. Each record includes information, such as event type, actor involvement, precise geographic location, duration, evolution and escalation, fatality estimates and contextual notes. Datasets like ACLED contribute to displacement research because they provide the kind of differentiation and disaggregation necessary for understanding why conflicts may lead to distinct displacement outcomes.

Challenges, however, remain: all event-based conflict data based on news data can suffer from underreporting, particularly in rural areas and geolocation issues affecting accuracy. UCDP GED's focus on fatality thresholds may miss important low-level violence that still contributes to displacement [35]. Compared to conflict data, migration research has lagged in applying an events-based approach to migration data. IDMC has been using an event-based monitoring approach for displacement in specific contexts. For proper analysis of interactions and outcomes, data on conflict and displacement need to be analysed at the same scale [36].

BOX 5. South Sudan

South Sudan exemplifies the problem of relying solely on national data, obscuring important nuances. Sub-national analysis shows that areas most affected by conflict experienced greater out-migration, while regions with less violence sometimes saw in-migration during the same period. This challenges the potential assumption that conflict within a country leads to displacement everywhere equally. The three maps below reveal (1) patterns of net migration and conflict events at the country level, (2) at the first-order sub-national (regional) level, and (3) at the second-order sub-national (local) level, visually highlighting how our understanding of migration and conflict can vary dramatically depending on the scale of analysis [37].

Figure 4. Net migration and conflict events, South Sudan. Figure is directly taken from Marta Bivand Erdal et al., 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Conflict-Related Determinants of Migration'



BOX 6. Data innovations

Mobile phone data, social media analytics, satellite imagery, traffic information, and internet activity can be used to provide greater granularity and coverage, as well as near real-time availability. In April 2022, online surveys accessible via mobile devices were deployed in Ukraine to understand people's migration intentions. However, limitations remain, and such data collection methodologies are often experimental or used in tandem with methods that are more traditional [38].

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: SNIPPETS FROM THE LITERATURE

Findings from various studies underscore how interactions between proximity, threat type, conflict duration and individual characteristics prove most informative when analysed as part of complex, interactive relationships, rather than single factor dimensions. Contextual and historical particularities remain crucial considerations - as similar interactions in different context reveal opposing effects. Some context-specific examples:

- **higher media access** negatively correlated with likelihood of being **threatened** by armed groups in Colombia [39].

- refugee and IDP flows between 1989-2017 revealed that **government violence** primarily drove **refugee flows** - as government's coercive power remained effective within its territory -, while **rebel violence** generated **internal displacement**, at least until violence became more widespread [40].

- during the Lebanese civil war, **direct violence,** such as torture or sexual violence, likely increased the likelihood of **international flight**, while **indirect violence**, such as shelling usually led to **internal displacement** [41].

- Syrian and Somali refugee movements showed that **violence** and **uncertainty** at checkpoints were central deterrents to civilian movements, as inconsistent rules and uncertainty became instrumentalised [42].

- a measure of **political terror** showed a strong positive relationship with **new asylum claims** [43].

- countries with **better democratic institutions and respect for human rights** saw fewer **asylum applications** [44]; however, **democratic reforms** paradoxically increased displacement in Colombia by making political identities visible targets for rival paramilitaries [45].

- Syrian and Libyan displacement showed that **initial displacement** within conflict zones was often the first of many **subsequent displacements** [46].

4. EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES ANALYSIS

THE SIX CASE STUDIES

The selected case studies - Myanmar, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela - differ from each other in terms of: 1) scale and type (internal/cross-border) of displacement, 2) conflict severity/intensity, and 3) level of fragility. The detailed description of their displacement and conflict characteristics, as well as contextual factors, are found in the Annex.

Fragility is defined by the OECD as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient resilience of a system, state or community to manage, absorb and mitigate those risks. The OECD multidimensional fragility framework, first introduced in 2016, assesses fragility on a spectrum of intensity and across six dimensions: economic, environmental, human, political, security, and societal. Each dimension is comprised of composite indicators and the level of fragility is indicated by the length of the arm (e.g., see Figure 11). The framework analyses a total 177 contexts exposed to varying levels of fragility. Of these, 43 contexts were identified as experiencing high fragility and 18 as experiencing extreme fragility [48]. OECD analysis finds that violent conflict is highly concentrated in contexts with high and extreme fragility. For example, in 2023, 27 of the 61 contexts with high and extreme fragility were affected by organised violence. Furthermore, contexts with high and extreme fragility generate and host most of the world forcibly displaced. Notably, over 100 million refugees and internally displaced persons originate in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, representing around four fifths of forcibly displaced persons worldwide.

The independent global conflict monitor system **ACLED** collects, analyses, and maps data on conflict and protest. It aims to capture type, agents, location, date, and other characteristics of political violence events, demonstration events, and other select non-violent, politically relevant developments in every country and territory in the world [49]. ACLED records different types of events (e.g. battles, protests, riots, explosions/remote violence, and violence against civilians) and sub-event types (e.g. air/drone strikes, shelling/artillery/missile attacks). ACLED has also developed a Conflict Index that provides a global assessment of how and where conflicts in every country and territory in the world vary according to four indicators: deadliness, danger to civilians, geographic diffusion, and the number of armed groups. Analysis conducted on 2024 data shows that global conflict levels have almost doubled since 2020 (104,371 recorded in 2020, 200,000 events in 2024). The increase is attributed to large conflicts beginning or restarting during that period – notably Ukraine, Gaza, and Myanmar – coupled with continued violence in other countries with high rates of conflict, such as Sudan, Mexico, Yemen, and Sahel countries [50].

Figure 5 plots, for the six case studies and a selection of other major crises, the stock of IDPs

Table 1. Overview of key displacement, conflict and fragility indicators across our six cases

	Displacement		Conflict		Fragility
Country or territory	**Num of displaced (in million)**	**% of population**	**ACLED conflict index level**	**ACLED conflict index ranking**	**OECD Fragility Framework**
Myanmar	4.9	9%	extreme	2nd	high
Palestine	7.9	143%	extreme	1st	high
Syria	11.7	48%	extreme	3rd	extreme
Sudan	14.4	29%	extreme	8th	extreme
Ukraine	8.6	23%	high	14th	medium to low
Venezuela	8.2	29%	high	27th	high

Figure 5. Stock of IDPs relative to refugees and people in refugee-like situations 2024. The size of circles represents the proportion of displaced population relative to total population. Source: JRC elaboration on UNHCR, UNRWA and IDMC data



against the number of refugees and people in refugee like situations in 2024. The size of the respective circles is proportional to the ratio of the displaced population relative to total population. Countries such as Sudan and Myanmar lie far to the right of the graph, with far more IDPs than refugees, whereas Venezuela lies in the upper part of the graph, with predominantly international displacement. Syria and Ukraine sit closer to parity between internal and cross border displacement, although for different reasons. Palestine combines massive multi-generational refugeehood generated by past wars with a current phase of almost exclusively internal displacement in Gaza, where people are displaced repeatedly within a sealed territory.

These patterns cannot be read as simple functions of "conflict severity" or level of fragility. Palestine, Myanmar, Syria and Sudan all experience extreme levels of conflict, yet they produce very different IDP and refugee numbers. Nor can they be reduced to income level or region, given that Ukraine and Venezuela are both middle income countries but sit on opposite sides of the scatterplot. Instead, displacement dynamics appear to emerge from *interactions* of conflict features, state behaviour, geography, legal and policy environments, economic resources and networks.

BOX 7. Displacement as intent

Conflict may cause displacement - a by-product or merely collateral damage -, but it can also use displacement as a strategic tool [51]. Displacement has been used as a tool for territorial or social control, information gathering, ethnic or political cleansing, and population sorting [52]. Civilian responses can vary depending on each case, with differential implications for who moves, how they do so, and to where. Violence in the form of ethnic cleansing, for example, is likely to lead to group clustering abroad (e.g. Rohingyas from Myanmar). Forced relocation can prompt people to regroup and settle according to political or ethnic affiliations or under promises of aid, in areas) - where they may subsequently face higher, more concentrated threats or be in need of protection systems. The case of Palestine clearly highlights displacement as not just a consequence of conflict but a primary objective. The systematic destruction of housing, schools, and hospitals, coupled with severed access to essential resources, not only displaces an entire population but also severely diminishes their prospects for safe and sustainable return. This reality has been described as genocide by dozens of international organisations and rights bodies.

DRIVERS SHAPING DISPLACEMENT ACROSS AND WITHIN BORDERS

A comparative review reveals potential patterns across the six cases, which could be tested in further research. We particularly focus on the dimensions of proximity, duration, actors, access and resources.

a) Proximity: People tend to move as close as possible, internally, if there are safe regions within the country

Where violence is concentrated in particular regions, and parts of the country remain relatively safe, displacement tends to be predominantly internal. Conversely, countries in which multiple regions are affected by violence and where there are no internal safe zones tend to produce higher shares of refugees [53]. If borders are closer, easier to reach or in the case of small states, violence tends to generate more refugee flows [54].

In Syria, many households initially moved short distances, for example from contested suburbs into central Damascus or from front-line towns into provincial capitals. Over time, when the war extended across much of the country and the central state itself became a party to the conflict, repeated displacement, sieges and the destruction of housing reduced the viability of internal havens and pushed a growing share towards neighbouring countries, and later Europe [55]. Similarly, large parts of government-held Ukraine have functioned as internal havens. Millions of Ukrainians displaced from the east and south have moved to central and western regions where state institutions function and basic services continue. By contrast, for the Rohingya in Myanmar, the combination of military operations and long-standing segregation meant that relocation within the country was never a real option, so violence translated almost immediately into cross border flight into Bangladesh. In Sudan, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces and other militias has been intense but geographically uneven. Large numbers have moved from Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan often over short distances. While people in Darfur and West Kordofan have also crossed into neighbouring Chad and South Sudan, the sheer size of Sudan and the high costs and risks of reaching borders mean that many stop inside the country.

b) Duration: longer conflicts can lead to more displacement overall and increase the likelihood of cross-border movement

Protracted conflicts tend to generate more displacement, both in terms of refugees and IDPs. Long wars often show a “displacement continuum”, where many people become IDPs first and refugees later, with lack of durable solutions for IDPs being one reason why they subsequently move abroad [56].

Syria and Afghanistan show how long conflicts stack different displacement episodes on top of each other. In Syria, initial internal movements

within contested governorates were followed by regional refugee movements to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and then by further secondary movements as the war dragged on and prospects for return or integration faded. During the 1980s and 1990s many Afghans were displaced internally, often multiple times, before the protracted nature of conflict and deteriorating livelihoods pushed millions to cross into Pakistan and Iran as refugees; later cycles of fighting after 2001 produced new internal displacement alongside refugee return and renewed outflows.

c) Actors: state persecution, capacity and fragility

Displacement dynamics are largely shaped bywhether the state is a source of protection or persecution and its coercive and administrative capacity. State violations of physical integrity rights are strong predictors of refugee-like flows, and threats emanating from the government are likely to provoke flight [57]. In contrast, dissident violence tends to produce IDPs, because people can still flee to state-controlled areas when rebels are the main threat [58], [59]. State capacity and fragility can lead to both more or less displacement. Higher levels of economic development and state capacity are associated with lower refugee outflows once conflict is controlled for, suggesting that better-resourced states can protect civilians and manage crises internally [60]. Yet capable states can also persecute more effectively making internal refuge impossible [61] or trapping populations in its own territory.

Venezuela and Colombia illustrate how similar levels of violence and fragility can translate into different displacement patterns. Colombia's decades-long conflict, involving guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and criminal actors, has produced a huge IDP population and comparatively fewer refugees. Many Colombians flee from non-state armed groups into areas where state presence is stronger, remaining inside the country. Venezuela's crisis, by contrast, is characterised by a combination of authoritarian drift, economic collapse and politicised repression by state and quasi-state actors. Internal displacement persists, but most seek refuge abroad. Regional asylum and regularisation policies - expanded on further below - then transform these movements into one of the largest refugee-like situations in the world.

d) Access: Legal pathways, access to neighbouring countries

Even when people aspire to leave the country and face severe threats, whether they actually become refugees depends heavily on access to neighbouring countries and the availability of legal pathways or porous borders [62]. Where neighbours are hostile, borders are closed or people are prevented from leaving, displacement remains largely internal, or the situation leads to immobility.

Venezuelans have moved into a regional environment shaped by the Cartagena Declaration's recognition of people in need of international protection. Colombia, Peru, Brazil and others have at different times opened special visas or temporary protection statuses, making it possible for large numbers of Venezuelans to obtain at least minimal legal residence. Shared language and extensive land borders further lower barriers. Similarly, although safe areas are present within Ukraine and the state is perceived primarily as a protective entity, many Ukrainians chose to cross into neighbouring EU states, where the EU's Temporary Protection Directive grants legal stay and access to services. Conversely, in Gaza, whose borders with Israel and Egypt are under tight control, all displacement takes place within the Strip, in short and precarious moves.

Extreme violence in Sudan led to the world's largest IDP crisis, but to a relatively smaller refugee population [63]. Borders from Darfur into Chad or from Kordofan into South Sudan are porous: they lead into countries with their own conflicts, limited services and constrained asylum systems. Sudanese who cross into Chad or South Sudan, often end up in remote camps with severe food insecurity and minimal prospects of long-term integration. Egypt has progressively tightened entry and visa rules greatly restricting access to the country, and legal pathways to other countries are almost non-existent and very costly. By contrast, South Sudan has produced both a large number of refugees and of IDPs with respect to its population. This is primarily due to neighbouring Uganda's long-standing "open door" approach that gives refugees from South Sudan plots of land, freedom of movement and the right to work, and made Uganda one of the world's largest refugee hosts.

e) Resources: networks and economic means

Economic capacity and social networks are major dividers between refugees, IDPs and the immobile [64]. Wealth and education increase the probability of longer-distance and international migration in conflict settings, while the poorest are overrepresented among IDPs and the immobile [65]. Social networks and diaspora reduce both financial and informational barriers to cross-border flight.

In Sudan, 59% of the population is below the international poverty line and 49% of it is food insecure. While high-income households and people with greater access to international networks have been better able to reach Egypt or Gulf states, most of the population has only been able to move short distance to safer villages, informal sites or urban peripheries. Rural and low-income households, especially women-headed households, have often been effectively trapped in highly insecure environments. For these households, the cost of reaching an international border, paying smugglers or sustaining themselves in a neighbouring country is prohibitive [66].

INSIGHTS ON DISPLACEMENT OUTCOMES THROUGH THE ASPIRATION-CAPABILITIES LENS

In addition to the common patterns identified, the value of the six cases comparison lies in showing how different combinations of the same ingredients can lead to very different displacement outcomes. Each crisis represents a specific alignment of proximity, duration, actors, access and resources. Sudan's very high IDP numbers reflect the combination of spatially uneven fighting with remaining internal safe areas, blocked or unattractive regional exit options and widespread poverty. Venezuela's predominantly international displacement arises from state centred persecution and collapse, relatively open borders and regularisation schemes in neighbouring countries, plus strong regional networks that lower the cost of leaving. Ukraine's near parity between IDPs and refugees comes from a protective state that offers internal havens, combined with a highly accessible and generous external protection regime.

This heterogeneity of displacement outcomes across cases can be partially understood through the aspirations–capabilities lens, as previously introduced. In particular, the application of the aspirations-capabilities framework reveals that:

- **Conflict intensity alone cannot predict IDP-to-refugee ratios.** Myanmar and Sudan both experience extreme violence yet conflict generates predominantly internal displacement, while Ukraine's high intensity interstate war produces more balanced internal and external flows due to preferential access to neighbouring countries.

- **Involuntary immobility is a distinct displacement outcome requiring targeted protection response.** In many cases, the "involuntarily immobile" populations overlap strongly with the poorest households who either remain in conflict zones or move only very short distances. The trapped populations in Gaza, rural Darfur, northern Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladesh face existential threats but lack the means to reach safety.

- **The same structural factor can produce opposite effects depending on capabilities.** State persecution may contribute to refugee flows when borders are accessible (Venezuelans, Ukrainians) but is associated with internal displacement or entrapment when they are not (Palestinians, some Sudanese). Legal pathways and access policies define capabilities here. In Palestine, blocked capabilities through Israeli control of borders and the population registry contribute to entrapment - even for many of those with financial resources. On the other hand, temporary protection schemes for Ukrainians in the EU and Venezuelans in the neighbouring region added capabilities. They enabled also less wealthy households and more vulnerable groups - as women with children - to cross borders and migrate across longer distancess.

- **Individual level characteristics shape different outcomes within a given context.** In nearly all cases, wealth, education, social capital, gender, age and urban residence shape who becomes a refugee versus an IDP versus immobile.

Importantly, the relationship between capabilities and aspiration is context-dependent and dynamic. High capabilities do not always translate to cross-

border movement. Some Ukrainians with economic means chose to stay and support resistance efforts. Some Syrians with resources opted for internal relocation to maintain property and await return. In the same vein, high aspiration to flee do not always indicate greater objective danger - perceptions of threat, shaped by information flows and social networks, can diverge from measurable violence exposure. Displacement outcomes therefore emerge from the interaction of a wide set of enabling and constraining contextual factors and individual circumstances.

Refugees and those who move long distances are therefore those who have the highest aspirations but also highest capabilities including resources and networks to cross borders and sustain themselves, at least initially, abroad.

BOX 8. Quantifying factors: what can and cannot be measured

Some displacement factors are readily quantifiable - conflict fatalities (ACLED, UCDP), refugee and IDP stocks (UNHCR, IOM, IDMC), or GDP and poverty rates. Others - like safety perceptions or family obligation - resist standardisation despite equal or greater importance for displacement outcomes. Event-based conflict datasets like ACLED provide valuable intensity metrics, but they need to be complemented by important contextual specificities. In Myanmar and Venezuela, information shutdowns and statistical censorship further complicate data reliability. Moving from comparative analysis to policy-relevant monitoring requires acknowledging both the value and limitations of quantitative factors easily found in datasets, measured and tracked in real time - and the potential for qualitative complementation through consideration of more ambiguous, harder to quantify, context-dependent factors like perceptions, social networks, and local governance dynamics.

5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Many EU policy fields could benefit from a more granular and interactive understanding of conflict-related displacement. The table introduces the main policy domains engaging with conflict, displacement and the relevant factors surrounding them. It gives a broad view of relevant preparedness, planning, and development points for consideration from a short- and longer-term perspective.

What follows are several sample policy responses from the ground that can help to explore various approaches to the context and implications of conflict-related displacement:

- **Establishing holistic monitoring frameworks** tracking elements like actor type involvement and extent of violence; extent of economic collapse (e.g. GDP contraction, poverty spikes); shifts in border policy (e.g. visa requirements, free movement suspensions); infrastructure targeting and state of infrastructure (e.g., energy, water, healthcare facilities). Sudan, for example, demonstrates how extreme violence combined with economic freefall, can produce a rapid escalation in displacement. An understanding of the multiple, interactive dimensions behind that can help provide early warnings and forecasts.
- **Creating safe mobility corridors from contexts with intense violence:** Sudan's weak passport (13 countries visa-free) and Palestine's closed borders trap populations in danger zones. Humanitarian visa programmes, regional mobility agreements, and expanded resettlement

Table 2. Addressing conflict-related displacement situations – the role of evidence and data across policy areas

Foreign policy/external relations	Humanitarian, protection, development policy	Migration and asylum policy
Preparedness and anticipatory actions (short term)		
Anticipate conflict-related displacement situations and possible political and socio-economic repercussions in affected regions/countries.	Anticipate and prepare for displacement crises with substantial humanitarian-development dimensions.	Monitor, anticipate and prepare for migratory situations in the EU, e.g. possible onwards movements of migrants and refugees from regions/countries of origin.
Activate diplomatic channels and operational actions with partner countries to influence early responses to displacement situations (e.g. through the MOCADEM mechanism) [67].	Enable short term and emergency measures based on early warning methods to support displaced populations and countries/regions hosting them.	Develop early warning systems, risk monitoring tools and multi-stakeholder contingency plans to prevent and respond to rapidly unfolding migration situations in EU Member States (e.g. in the context of the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint).
Strategic planning and policy development (medium term)		
Inform strategic priorities and partnerships with regions and countries at risk of displacement situations or impacted by protracted displacement.	Identify funding priorities and design interventions linking humanitarian, development and peace assistance in support of displaced populations and host communities.	Design flexible migration and asylum management systems capable of withstanding increases in arrivals (e.g. through accelerated and/or simplified asylum procedures, strengthened solidarity measures in cases of large arrivals).
	In partnership with host countries, design programmes and initiatives to enhance livelihood opportunities and self-reliance of populations in situations of displacement.	Design external strategies and policy interventions to manage migration and asylum in cooperation with third countries (e.g. safe pathways of admission for refugees and migrants, voluntary return and reintegration support, provision of information to displaced people on the move in the context of anti-smuggling initiatives).

programmes targeting immobilised populations could all enable life-saving movement.

- **Investing in displacement data collection and monitoring systems in under-documented contexts:** Venezuela's sparse IDP data due to government censorship and the difficulty in verifying death tolls in Sudan demonstrate the need for better tracking tools, monitoring networks, and methodologies to combat access and granularity constraints that render conflict and displacement data incomplete. A localised approach would allow creating a clearer picture of the impact of conflict on different population groups, accounting for ethnic, gender-related or socioeconomic differences among displaced populations. Sub-national information is key for both targeting of scarce resources and designing interventions that do not further exacerbate conflict or displacement.

- **Differentiating funding strategies by displacement duration and mobility constraints:** Protracted crises like Palestine's 77 years, Syria's 14 years, Myanmar's Rohingya's 8+ years might require a shift from emergency and humanitarian to development approaches. These could entail investment in host countries' education, healthcare, and other public infrastructure and longer-term self-reliance measures, rather than camp-based aid. Cases of entrapment and involuntary immobility, such as Palestine and Sudan, might call for innovative and remote assistance delivery programmes and community-based protection mechanisms.

- **Addressing hyper-localised displacement concentrations near conflict zones:** Most of Sudan's IDPs relocate in close proximity to active conflict, which may require specific humanitarian access negotiations to frontline areas; assistance enabling longer-distance relocation for those wishing to move; and transitional shelter programmes in safer reception areas.

- **Supporting pendular and circular mobility rather than assuming one-way, linear displacement:** Ukraine and Syria demonstrate how many of those displaced maintain ties in both origin and host areas, engaging in seasonal or temporary returns for reasons of employment or family visits despite ongoing insecurity. Flexible assistance programmes and permit systems accommodating fluid mobility patterns could be fruitful to affected populations and states on all ends.

- **Combatting information blackouts that enable the perpetuation or concealment of violence:** Myanmar's systematic internet shutdowns — termed "digital dictatorship" — and the ban on independent media from accessing Gaza impede aid delivery and obscure human rights violations. Satellite internet has been provided to conflict zones, such as Ukraine, in the past. The EU could help deploy satellite internet capacity to maintain contact with populations in need and support independent media networks.

These policy pathways should be seen as adaptable to specific displacement contexts, rather than prescriptive actions. Evidence from diverse policy interventions demonstrates that protection works best when adapted to local circumstances, host country capacities, and the socio-economic profiles of displaced populations. What succeeds in one setting - such as the temporary protection mechanisms in Europe or extended refugee definition in Latin America - may require substantial adaptation in contexts with different legal traditions, resource constraints, or political dynamics.

DATA AND FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS IN SUPPORT TO POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Effective policy and operational initiatives depend on the capacity of policy actors to anticipate, prevent and respond to complex displacement situations. In turn, this capacity relies on timely, reliable and disaggregated data. The analysis of our case studies revealed the following data and research needs:

- **Establishing holistic monitoring frameworks.** Effective policy responses to displacement depend on comprehensive baseline data that captures the multiple factors shaping displacement patterns. Holistic monitoring frameworks enable policymakers to move beyond reactive responses toward anticipatory approaches, using forecasting and foresight techniques to understand how displacement dynamics may evolve. These predictive

capabilities require timely, disaggregated data across different displacement dimensions, combined with analytical frameworks that explain how various drivers - conflict, climate, economic factors - interact to influence mobility. Myanmar and Syria, for example, show how environmental shocks can amplify and complicate conflict displacement, requiring proactive disaster response capacity in active conflict zones. Predictive models should incorporate drought cycles, earthquake risk zones, flood vulnerability, etc. to anticipate compounding crises.

- **Expand availability and analysis of sub-national data.** The increased availability of sub-national-level data on both conflict and displacement dynamics (already available for some of the displacement situations analysed in this chapter) would allow to shed light on how conflict characteristics (intensity, types of events or the involvement of specific actors) impact on displacement locally, for example in specific regions or provinces. The same localised approach would allow creating a clearer picture of the impact of conflict on different population groups, accounting for ethnic, gender-related or socioeconomic differences among displaced populations. Sub-national information is key for both targeting of scarce resources and designing interventions that do not further exacerbate conflict or displacement.

- **Invest in displacement data collection and monitoring systems in under-documented contexts.** Some of the cases reviewed in this chapter underline the need to design tracking tools and methodologies that can be effective also when access constraints limit the availability of conflict and displacement data. Venezuela's sparse IDP data due to government censorship and the difficulty in verifying death tolls in Sudan are cases in point of the above-mentioned need.

- **Expand existing knowledge on mobility enablers/constraints.** The relationships between internal displacement and cross-border movements deserves further consideration. This requires improving existing knowledge of the factors that constrain or enable individuals' decisions to relocate across borders. Some of the factors described in this chapter include resource availability, visa restrictions, diaspora networks, access to legal status and socioeconomic rights in neighbouring countries. Improving existing methods to collect evidence on the role played by those factors (e.g. large-scale surveys or interviews with people on the move or refugees) can help to shed light on existing differences in the ratio between IDPs and refugees across displacement situations characterised by high levels of conflict.

- **Explore the benefits (and drawbacks) of alternative legal frameworks beyond formal refugee status:** Temporary protection and residence permits granted throughout Latin America combined with an extended definition of "refugee" can serve as a model - and provide valuable lessons - for other large-scale mixed migration crises when attempting to adapt response frameworks to local contexts. Similarly, the EU's activation of the Temporary Protection Directive in March 2022 provided immediate protection and socio-economic rights to over 4 million people fleeing Ukraine. Further research could explore the feasibility and usefulness of similar frameworks in other regions.

In conclusion, refinements to existing datasets and data collection processes, as well as the exploration of innovative data sources, could be instrumental to better policymaking. At the same time, further analysis on specific conflict-displacement links could deepen the understanding of complex dynamics and allow monitoring only the most relevant factors.

ANNEX - CASE STUDIES

MYANMAR

Conflict level: Extreme
Change category: Consistently concerning
Number of IDPs: 3.5 million, 6% of population
Number of refugees from Myanmar: 1.4 million, 3% of population[2]
Population: 54.5 million
Income level: lower-middle income
Below extreme poverty line: 27.3 million, 50% of population
People facing hunger: 16.7 million, 31% of population [68]

Sources: ACLED, IDMC, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP. All the data in the table are for 2024.

OVERVIEW

Ongoing conflict in Myanmar is rooted in decades of military rule, ethnic exclusion and struggles over state power. Since independence in 1948, the country has faced continuous warfare between the central army and numerous ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) seeking various degrees of autonomy and federal rights. This has led to protracted displacement, particularly in border regions. Periodic military offensives, forced relocations, and human rights abuses have pushed million from their homes over the decades, with the 2016-2017 military campaign against the Rohingya in Rakhine State marking one of the largest and most brutal episodes of targeted violence. The February 2021 coup reignited long-standing tensions on a national scale, collapsing the fragile peace process and triggering renewed instability, civil war, state collapse, a humanitarian crisis, and displacement that now affects 3.5 million people. The crisis is aggravated by natural disasters and extreme weather events in recent years [69].

CONFLICT

The 2021 military coup by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) reignited and transformed the country's long-running internal conflicts into a full-scale nationwide civil war. The Tatmadaw seized power from the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, sparking mass protests that were violently suppressed. In response, the opposition formed the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing, the People's Defence Force (PDF). What had once been a patchwork of localised insurgencies became a country-wide resistance movement made up of diverse EAOs. The Tatmadaw has responded with airstrikes, artillery, scorched-earth tactics, razing villages and often deliberately displacing millions [70]. Following are some key characteristics of the conflict:

- **Geographic diffusion**: fighting has spread from border regions into nearly every of Myanmar's regions, marking an unprecedented geographic diffusion of violence. Dozens of EAOs have emerged in areas that had not seen war for generations, often coordinating between them. Previously concentrated in Rakhine state, violence has spread to central regions predominantly populated by the majority Bamar ethnic group, which had seen decades of relative peace [71]. The nationwide spread has fragmented state control, with many rural areas under resistance or mixed authority by groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied PDF, which

2 Due to disparities in availability of data, figure designates population under national poverty line by end of 2023.

Figure 6. Overview of conflict-related factors in Myanmar. Production Date: 25 November 2025. Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.



control large parts of Kachin state. By late 2024, the military controlled only 21% of Myanmar's territory, while rebel and ethnic forces held 42%, with remaining areas contested [72].

- **Actors**: The Tatmadaw junta faces a broad coalition of resistance forces including the PDF, the National Unity Government (NUG), and over 25 EAOs representing the country's many ethnic groups. China is an influential external actor, brokering ceasefires and attempting to promote stability given economic interests related to Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects and critical resources [73].

- **Intensity of violence**: The 2017 military crackdown specifically targeted the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine state. Since then, conflict has expanded to involve many more ethnic armed groups. Following the 2021 coup, Myanmar has witnessed its most intense violence in decades, with ACLED recording thousands of violent incidents each year across nearly all regions and more than 15 000 fatalities just over the past 12 months [74]. The military has relied heavily on what many have referred to as scorched earth tactics, including airstrikes, shelling, and village burnings, causing widespread civilian casualties and destruction [75]. Resistance forces rely on ambushes and guerrilla attacks on army convoys and outposts. The UN and rights groups accuse the Tatmadaw of systemic war crimes [76].

- **Duration and evolution**: Following the 2021 coup, the conflict has evolved from initial pro-democracy protests into a full-scale civil conflict, accompanied by the military's declining territorial control [77]. The more than 3 million internally displaced people as of 2024 represent a threefold increase in conflict-related displacement since the coup [78]. The current escalation, however, builds on decades of civil conflict ever since Myanmar's independence in 1948.

- **Damage to infrastructure and services**: Conflict has caused catastrophic damage to infrastructure and essential services across the country. Tens of thousands of homes and buildings were torched or destroyed [79]. The healthcare system has faced systematic destruction, with at least 263 healthcare facilities attacked, dozens of health workers killed, and hundreds arrested for affiliating with the anti-coup movement [80]. Deliberate targeting of infrastructure extends to religious buildings, schools, and clinics. The use of airstrikes, artillery shelling, drone attacks, and arson severely hinders humanitarian access in opposition-held territories where the junta obstructs essential services [81].

DISPLACEMENT

Around 9% of the country's population is displaced. There are more than 3.6 million internally displaced people, primarily because of violence following the 2021 coup. Most of the refugees outside the country are in Bangladesh and are from the Rohingya ethnic group [82]. Most cross-border displacement consists of the Rohingya's vast 2017 exodus, which has now reduced in intensity. Most internal displacement is the result of post-2021 coup's reshuffling of the conflict landscape.

The following points highlight the main displacement trends:

- **IDPs**: IDPs reached a record high of 3.6 million by early 2025 with the majority concentrated in the Northwest, Rakhine State, the Southeast, and Kachin State in the Northeast [83]. Only a small part of those IDPs were displaced before the 2021 coup, which resulted in a 72% surge in IDPs in just one year. Only 15% of IDPs reside in formal camps, with vast majority enduring harsh conditions in informal shelters, host communities, or forested areas lacking adequate basic services [84].

- **Refugees**: More than 1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar are currently in neighbouring countries, with the largest concentration in Bangladesh, which hosts 1 163 000 refugees - predominantly Rohingya, who have historically been labelled as aliens to be expelled. This narrative is rooted in the 1982 Citizenship Law, which effectively stripped the Rohingya of citizenship, rendering them stateless and denying them basic rights. Malaysia hosts 188 000 refugees from Myanmar, Thailand and India come up next [85]. Many of the neighbouring countries are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is one key

Figure 7. Refugees and other people of concern to UNHCR, UNHCR 2024; per country, when >=20 000. Graph shows stocks of internally displaced persons per year, IDMC 2024[3]. Source: JRC elaboration on UNHCR and IDMC data



reason refugee statistics are likely undercounts. Thailand, for example, does not grant foreign nationals formal refugee status or protection, so UNHCR numbers represent only those it can access for protection and assistance. Recent estimates suggest there might be as many as 5 million migrant workers from Myanmar in Thailand (largely not Rohingya due to their geographic distance, costs, and barriers), many of which would be otherwise recognised as refugees - and far surpassing official UNHCR figures [86]. Bangladesh is also not a signatory of the refugee convention, but since most of those displaced there live in camps and shelters, their count is more likely to be relatively accurate.

- **Duration of displacement**: Myanmar's displacement crisis is characterised by both protracted and recent displacement. The Rohingya have faced displacement for decades, culminating in the 2017 exodus when over 750 000 fled to Bangladesh - a crisis that UN officials described as "textbook ethnic cleansing" [87]. More than eight years later, the majority of Rohingya refugees remain in Bangladesh's camps with no safe pathway to return [88].

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Economic collapse has been very significant [89]. The conflict's geographic spread across multiple regions, combined with systematic infrastructure destruction and military blockades, has disrupted humanitarian access and migration routes, forcing people into remote areas [90]. Neighbouring countries, such as Thailand, have tightened border controls [91]. Myanmar refugees, primarily

3 Due to recognition and data gaps, UNHCR data does not fully represent Myanmar's cross-border displacement. The difference is most stark in the case of Thailand, where there are an estimated nearly 2 million regular migrants from Myanmar (2023) - with some estimates of documented and undocumented

Figure 8. Myanmar's fragility indicators 2024. Source: JRC elaboration on OECD Fragility Framework data



Rohingya in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar camps, endure overcrowded and precarious conditions with limited access to basic services, frequent threats from organised violence, and deteriorating shelter and sanitation conditions exacerbated by humanitarian funding shortages and climate hazards.

Myanmar is categorised by the OECD as a country experiencing **high overall fragility** and severe fragility across four dimensions (environmental, political, security, and societal), alongside high fragility in the economic dimension and moderate fragility in the human dimension. Myanmar is vulnerable to high to severe risks in the security dimensions due to its cross-border and internally displaced population and historical deaths from non-state and war. Forced displacement and societal exclusion are key risks (high to severe) contributing to societal fragility, while environmental-related displacement is a key risk (high to severe) related to environmental fragility [92].

- **Economic collapse and infrastructural damage**: Myanmar has experienced a dramatic economic collapse, with more than half of the population now living below the poverty line, double the rate from 2017 [93]. In addition to damaged infrastructure, monthly incomes and currency collapse means most displaced people lack the financial resources for long-distance migration or even survival in host areas.

- **Safety and proximity**: Most displaced persons flee to nearby areas due to immediate security threats and limited resources, with most residing outside formal camps in forests or informal settlements [94]. Geographic proximity to borders influences where refugees flee, with the largest concentrations in neighbouring Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia [95]. The Rohingya have largely fled to Bangladesh due to proximity and costs. Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh is the world's largest and most densely populated refugee camp, experiencing severe overcrowding and infrastructure and services overstretch - though this originates from earlier displacement following the 2017 military crackdown that specifically targeted the Rohingya Muslim minority, and which is ongoing [96]. Other ethnic groups have access to mobility corridors that the Rohingya do not. Many have moved internally to areas controlled by their respective ethnic armed organisations, or temporary buffer zones. Geography, economics, and some degree of tolerance has pushed many towards Thailand, despite the informal work status of many there.

- **Legal pathways**: Legal pathways for Myanmar nationals are severely constrained, with countries like Thailand recently granting very limited working rights to select groups of refugees, while restricting mobility of new arrivals and maintaining designated border camps [97]. Pushbacks, deportations, arrests of undocumented migrants, and overall increased immigration enforcement has been reported across Thailand, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, where the vast majority of Myanmar refugees find themselves [98].

- **Weak institutions**: The coup severely weakened democratic institutions, creating a security vacuum where civilians have no protection. State services including healthcare, education, water, and electricity are severely disrupted or destroyed. The military has systematically attacked health facilities, arrested healthcare workers, and obstructed humanitarian access [99].

- **Environmental factors**: Natural disasters have compounded Myanmar's conflict and displacement, adding to the already existing humanitarian emergency. In March 2025, a 7.7-7.9 earthquake struck near Mandalay, killing thousands and causing an equivalent of 14% of GDP-worth of damages to physical assets [100]. The earthquake's impact further hampered disaster relief efforts and information sharing. Monsoon flooding and Cyclone Wipha in July 2025 affected over 130 000 [101]. Climate-related hazards particularly affect the Rohingya in Bangladesh where cyclones, floods, and landslides are experienced in overcrowded camps [102].

- **Media and information**: Information and media freedom have been systematically weaponized by Myanmar's military junta. It has imposed more internet shutdowns than nearly any other country in 2024, primarily targeting resistance-controlled areas to isolate populations and obscure atrocities [103]. Since the coup, 135 journalists have been arrested and independent media outlets shut down, while Facebook and virtual private networks (VPNs) were blocked [104]. UN experts condemned this as "digital dictatorship," saying internet restrictions serve to hide ongoing violation and impede aid efforts [105]. Information blackouts particularly affect displaced populations' ability to make informed decision about safety and migration and coordinate with family members.

PALESTINE[4]

Conflict level: Extreme
Change category: Consistently concerning
Number of IDPs: 2 million, 37% population in Gaza and West Bank (over 90% of the population in Gaza displaced multiple times)
Number of refugees from Palestine: 5.9 million, 108% of the population (note below on different definitions)
Duration: Two years in the current iteration; conflict ongoing since 1948
Population: 5,5 million
Income level: Lower-middle income
Below poverty line: 2.2 million, 40% of the population (almost all households in Gaza and 28% in the West Bank)
People facing hunger: In Gaza, 90% food insecure and 25% famine

Sources: ACLED, IDMC, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP. All the data in the table are for 2024.

OVERVIEW

Displacement dynamics for Palestinians follow the overlapping layers of violence and expulsion throughout the last 77 years. Many displaced Palestinians today were - or are descendants of those who were - displaced due to the creation of Israel in 1948 and/or during the 1967 hostilities. There are about 6 million Palestinian refugees, mostly living in Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and Syria [106]. Gaza's population itself is made up for over 70% of descendants of Palestinian refugees of 1948, 1967 and/or subsequent waves of violence.

Following the attacks by Hamas in October 2023 that killed 1 200 people, Israel responded with a renewed phase of ever-intensifying violence in Gaza during which at least 70 000 people were killed by Israel to date [107], [108]. In the past two years, over 90% of the population of Gaza was displaced multiple times within the Strip; most were forced to relocate from the North and the East to the Southwest of the Strip due to ongoing and expanding violence and systematic destruction of people, infrastructure, and environment by Israel [109]. While Israel's blockade of the Strip makes it near impossible for people to leave Gaza, about 7,800 people were evacuated abroad for medical reasons [110]. Palestinians expelled from Israeli territory are not allowed to return and legal pathways to other countries remain limited. Dozens of international and legal organisations have called the situation in Gaza a genocide. [111].

CONFLICT

Since October 2023, Gaza has endured one of the most destructive military campaigns in recent history [112]. This full-scale aggression followed an attack by Hamas in which 1 200 people were killed. During the two years that followed, at least 70 000 people were killed, 80% of buildings were destroyed (generating an estimated 60 million tons of debris) and 90% of the population were repeatedly displaced [113], [114]. The delivery of humanitarian aid has been largely halted by Israel throughout the entire period of the active conflict, leading to almost the entire population

4 The term Palestine here refers to the **occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)**, comprising the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in line with United Nations terminology and international law, which recognise these areas as territories occupied by Israel since 1967. This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

Figure 9. Overview of conflict-related factors in Palestine. Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.



being food insecure and famine being confirmed in Northern Gaza in August 2025. A tenuous ceasefire agreement was reached on 9 October 2025, which led to prisoner and hostage exchanges and under which Israeli authorities promised to allow more aid to enter Gaza [115]. However, much of the Strip's territory remains controlled by Israeli forces.

In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violence has reached its highest levels in two decades. Israeli raids, settler attacks and home demolitions have displaced more than 7 200 Palestinians since 2023 [116],[117]. During the past two years, there has been an unprecedented expansion of illegal settlements and new Israeli housing units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, fragmenting the territory into isolated enclaves and creating movement restrictions.

- **Geographic diffusion**: During the past two years, the conflict has focused primarily on Gaza. In parallel, the West Bank has seen the sharpest violence and displacement recorded since UN monitoring began in 2005, driven by raids, settler attacks and demolitions[118]. Furthermore, at various points the conflict escalated into a regional confrontation, particularly during Israel's attacks in Lebanon and confrontation with Hezbollah, which persist into late 2025. Syria, Yemen, and Iran have also been recorded violent incidents involving Israel during the past two years [119].

- **Actors**: The conflict involves asymmetrical actors and complex alliances. The Israeli Defence Forces are Israel's army, which is highly trained and funded by the U.S. Hamas is Gaza's governing and militant body, which is designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. and the EU, while recognised as a legitimate political authority and resistance movement by others, such as Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. The EU's main counterpart is the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah (governing parts of the West Bank). In the West Bank, Israeli settlers, albeit practically civilians, have become semi-organised armed actors as well. Economic, political and military ties with other international actors have also played important roles in the conflict.

- **Intensity of violence**: The brutality of attacks, including alleged war crimes, ethnic cleansing and collective punishment, has drawn condemnation from UN officials and human rights organisations. Over the past two years, over 72 000 people (70 125 Palestinians and 1 983 Israelis) have been reported killed according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, the source used by Israeli intelligence services and NATO countries. Independent studies, however, have stressed the likelihood of severe undercounting; estimates including people killed because of the collapse of the medical system and lack of food, as well as those omitted from the count, likely put the number much higher [120]. The most recent study by the German Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research finds that the number of violent conflict-related deaths in Gaza likely surpasses 100 000, and that life expectancy in Gaza has fallen to less than half of what would have been expected since October 2023 [121]. Throughout the two years of intense violence, humanitarian aid was severely restricted from entering Gaza, intensifying food insecurity and famine conditions in the Strip [122]. On 22 October, the UN's International Court of Justice found that Israel is obliged to guarantee sufficient food to enter the strip and to allow UNRWA to operate in Gaza [123]. Hundreds of humanitarian and human rights organisations have described aid restrictions and Israeli violence in Gaza as a genocide[5]. The civilian casualty rate is exceptionally high: Israeli military data through May 2025 indicated approximately 83% of fatalities were civilians, with an average killing rate of 2 806 people per month [124].

- **Duration and evolution**: The past two years have seen extraordinary levels of violence concentrated in Gaza, marked by indiscriminate artillery and air strikes in densely populated areas, large-scale destruction and casualties. The ceasefire agreement signed in early October 2025 led to a marked decrease in violence, but has been violated hundreds of times since, leading to the killing of more than 300 Palestinians [125]. Political arrangements to follow remain uncertain. The current escalation sits atop 16 years of blockade in Gaza and decades of conflict since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the mass displacement of Palestinians during the Nakba [126], which continues to shape displacement patterns and claims [127].

- **Damage to infrastructure**, **environment and services**: Satellite imagery reveals that approximately 81% of structures in Gaza have been damaged as of November 2025 [128]. Reports estimate that 97% of school buildings have sustained some level of damage, with the vast majority requiring full reconstruction or major rehabilitation to function again [129]. WHO reports that at least 94% of hospitals are damaged or destroyed, and remaining facilities have operated well beyond capacity [130]. Children have been out of regular in-person school for more than two academic years, with only limited non-formal or remote provision being scaled up in late 2025 [131], [132]. Systematic environmental destruction has included the deliberate targeting of 98% of Gaza's tree cropland, contamination of soil and water supplies with munitions and untreated sewage, the bulldozing of seed banks preserving indigenous heirloom varieties, and the use of heavy metals and banned chemicals causing long-term irreversible damage to agricultural lands - actions characterized by UN investigators as ecocide and part of broader cultural extermination [133].

DISPLACEMENT

Roughly a third of the population of the occupied Palestinian territory has been internally displaced since late 2023. In Gaza, over 90% of the population remains internally displaced and has been displaced multiple times since October 2023. In the West Bank, thousands are displaced due to demolitions, settler violence, and access restrictions. In parallel, there are about 5.9 million registered Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate across the region [134]. The following points highlight the main displacement trends:

- **IDPs**: As of mid-late 2025, about 1.9 million people in Gaza remain internally displaced, with repeated re-displacement as front lines and evacuation orders shift [135]. Only a small

5 Notable examples include, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders, the United Nations Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Gaza Genocide, the International Association of Genocide Scholars, Oxfam and the Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem.

Figure 10. Palestine Refugees under UNRWA mandate 2024. Source: JRC elaboration on UNRWA data



minority stays in collective centres, while most shelter in informal sites or with host families [136]. Movement beyond short distances is constrained by insecurity and long-standing arbitrary closures through physical barriers, checkpoints, bureaucratic controls, and an effective besiegement, apart from limited medical evacuations. Following the October 2025 ceasefire, displacement remains widespread and highly unstable due to ongoing ceasefire violations, destroyed housing, and insecurity. Movement within Gaza remains severely constricted by Israeli military control, new demarcation lines and frequent shootings and arrests of civilians.

- **Refugees**: The population of registered Palestine refugees is around 5.9 million and they fall under the mandate of UNRWA, which was created in 1949 specifically for persons displaced in 1948 and their descendants. This is not a refugee population generated by the current war but by the 1948 and 1967 wars. They hold a distinct legal status in the countries in which UNRWA's mandate applies[6]. Roughly 38 % of the registered refugees are in Jordan, 26 % in Gaza, 17 % in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), 10 % in Syria and 8 % in Lebanon [137]. Because of Israeli laws and occupation, these refugees and their descendants are barred from entry into Israel and therefore unable to return to their original homes [138]. In host countries their legal status and access to services vary widely: in Jordan many have citizenship and broad access to public services, while in Lebanon refugees do not have citizenship, face legal restrictions on employment and property ownership, and rely heavily on UNRWA-provided education, health care and relief [139], [140].

- **Duration of displacement**: Displacement among Palestinians is both deeply acute and protracted. In Gaza, around 90% of the population are internally displaced and remain in limbo with limited prospects of return, as much of the territory has become uninhabitable. Movement out of Gaza is also effectively blocked by the longstanding closure and border restrictions, leaving the majority trapped inside [141]. At the same time, displacement for Palestine refugees represents a multi-generational condition: those uprooted in 1948 and 1967 as well as their descendants, now registered with UNRWA, have lived in exile for over seventy-five years and remain barred from returning to their original homes [142],[143].

6 For more on this, refer to "Palestine refugees" in the terminology

The absence of a political settlement, continuing destruction and lack of durable solutions mean that both recent and long-standing displacement risk becoming ever more protracted [144].

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Palestinian displacement is shaped by long-running fragility, occupation and a mobility regime that traps people close to danger. The fragility profile on the left captures how economic, political, human, environmental, and societal stressors stack in Palestine. Each dimension includes composite indicators and the length of the bars in each subgraph represents the severity of fragility for that specific dimension and indicator.

Palestine is classified by the OECD as experiencing **high overall fragility.** It experiences severe fragility in the security dimension, high in the economic and political dimensions and moderate fragility in the environmental, human, and societal dimensions. Displacement and historical deaths from war and non-state conflict contribute to in high to severe ways to fragility along the security dimension. Forced displacement is a severe risk in the societal dimension.

- **Economic collapse and resources**: The Gaza economy has been shattered. World Bank monitoring estimates Gaza unemployment reached roughly 80% by late 2024, with the West Bank at 29%, and projects that Gaza's real GDP per capita will not recover to pre-crisis levels before the 2030s without major policy change [145]. The 2025 interim rapid damage and needs assessment (carried out jointly by the EU, World Bank and UN) puts Gaza's physical damages at near USD 30 billion, with commerce and industry damages estimated at USD 5.9 billion. It also reports about 66% of commercial establishments destroyed and a further 22 percent damaged. Construction work in Gaza has also slowed by long-standing controls and blockages on construction materials entering the Strip [146],[147]. These constraints prolong displacement by delaying home repairs and livelihood recovery and further economic deterioration. Israel has withheld approximately $4 billion in Palestinian Authority tax revenues as of November 2024 - funds it collects on behalf of the PA under the Oslo Accords - citing offsets for debts and preventing transfers to Gaza, which has left the PA unable to pay public employees and pushed it toward financial collapse [148].
- **Safety and proximity**: Displacement in Palestine is confined to short, repeated movements within tightly restricted space. In Gaza, civilians move from one neighbourhood to another as crossings remain largely closed and internal routes are dangerous, producing cyclical displacement rather than sustained flight. In the West Bank, 849 movement obstacles - including permanently staffed checkpoints, road gates and roadblocks - fragment the territory and trap communities near conflict areas [149]. Crossing international borders is almost impossible.

Figure 11. Palestine's fragility indicators (OECD Fragility Framework). Source: JRC elaboration on OECD Fragility Framework data



- **Legal pathways**: Legal exit and internal movement are structurally constrained. Israel controls the Palestinian population registry and the permit system, which governs movement within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza, and through international crossings (e.g., Egypt, Jordan) [150]. Since the early 2000s, Israel's closure policy and permit regime has largely severed routine Gaza–West Bank travel and made relocation between the two extremely rare [151]. East Jerusalem Palestinians hold revocable residency rather than citizenship, with more than 14,800 revocations recorded since 1967, creating strong deterrents to leaving the city for extended periods. For refugees, the split UNRWA–UNHCR mandate under Article 1D means UNRWA covers Palestinians in its areas of operation (Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) while UNHCR applies only once they are outside those areas [152]. Outside UNRWA areas of operation, most Palestinians are not refugees but are often permanent residents, migrant workers, students, or naturalized descendants of earlier migrants. Main countries of destination include Chile that hosts the largest community of Palestinians outside the Arab world (about 500 000 people), Germany, the Gulf States and Egypt [153],[154]. In the EU, Palestinians are assessed under ordinary refugee or subsidiary protection rules, with some recorded as stateless depending on national practice [155],[156].

- **Weakened institutions**: Institutional capacity is fragmented. The Palestinian Authority's jurisdiction is limited, lacks legitimacy and is repeatedly disrupted by closures and raids [157]. Service provision for refugees depends heavily on UNRWA, which faces chronic funding crises, political accusations and unprecedented staff losses in Gaza since 2023. Funding by major donors like the U.S., the UK and some EU member states was cut almost immediately following Israel's claims that UNRWA participated in October 7 attacks, an allegation that independent investigations were not able to substantiate [158]. Humanitarian access is frequently constrained by approval regimes and insecurity, with documented patterns of denied or impeded missions that curtail assistance to displaced populations. This institutional fragility both fuels displacement and slows recovery or return. It also hinders credible and sustainable pathways to Palestinian statehood: Hamas previously received support from Israel with the aim of countering the secular Palestine Liberation Organisation to sow division and prevent the emergence of a unified Palestinian leadership capable of negotiating statehood [159].

- **Integration and host community support**: Where Palestinians are displaced outside the oPt, outcomes hinge on host-country policy. In Jordan, most but not all Palestine refugees hold citizenship and around 18% live in ten recognized refugee camps, which facilitates access to public services yet leaves pockets of deep poverty, especially among Gazans without nationality [160]. Even in Jordan, many Palestine refugees rely on UNRWA's service provision. In Lebanon, refugees lack citizenship, face legal limits on property ownership and dozens of professions, and depend more on UNRWA services than state systems, which entrenches long-term socioeconomic exclusion and strains host–refugee relations [161]. In Syria, approximately 440 000 Palestinian refugees remain from a pre-2011 population of 560 000, with 40% internally displaced due to the conflict. While Palestinians historically enjoyed relatively better access to education and employment than in Lebanon, the war has devastated their circumstances, and their legal status under the new Syrian authorities remains uncertain, leaving them dependent on severely curtailed UNRWA emergency assistance [162]. Inside the oPt, repeated waves of internal displacement create extreme overcrowding and burden already impoverished host families and municipalities.

- **Media and information**: Severe restriction on media access have fundamentally constrained independent documentation of conflict and displacement in Gaza. Israel has maintained a near-total ban on international journalists entering Gaza independently since October 2023. Simultaneously, the systematic targeting of Palestinian journalists - with over 260 media professionals killed, making this the deadliest conflict for journalists in decades according to the UN - has eliminated local witnesses and sources of information. Combined with recurring telecommunication blackouts during Israeli ground operations, these restrictions create information vacuums precisely when displacement movements are most acute, preventing real-time monitoring and assessment on who flees, who remains trapped and under what conditions [163].

SUDAN

Conflict level: Extreme
Change category: Consistently concerning
Number of IDPs: 11.6 million, 23% population
Number of refugees from Sudan: 2.8 million, 5.5% population
Population: 50.5 million
Income level: low
Below extreme poverty line: 29.8 million, 59% population
People facing hunger: 24.6 million, 48.7% population.

Sources: ACLED, IDMC, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP. All the data in the table are for 2024.

OVERVIEW

Displacement dynamics in Sudan's war reflect the interaction of extreme violence, economic collapse and constrained mobility [164]. Most people have fled short distances due to poverty, insecurity and the high cost of travel, creating vast concentrations of internally displaced persons near conflict zones. Limited legal pathways and tightening border controls restrict cross-border movement, while weak institutions and predatory armed groups hinder aid delivery and safe return. The conflict's fragmentation, regional ethnic ties and collapsing services have turned displacement into a chronic condition rather than a temporary response.

CONFLICT

Sudan's latest civil war erupted on 15 April 2023, pitting the national army (the Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF, led by al-Burhan) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary led by Mohamed "Hemedti" Dagalo, with roots in Darfur [165]. Tensions had been building since the two men jointly seized power in a 2021 coup, against the backdrop of Sudan's fragile political transition after decades of authoritarian rule. The fighting quickly spread from Khartoum to multiple regions, drawing in diverse armed groups and external actors. After over 500 days of siege, at the end of October, Darfur's capital El Fasher fell to the RSF. This triggered extreme violence and further deepened uncertainty about the country's future [166].

Following are key characteristics of the conflict:

- **Geographic diffusion:** Widespread fighting now engulfs a majority of Sudan's 18 states. Intense urban combat devastated the capital Khartoum and other major cities, while violence also rages across Darfur and Kordofan in the west and south. Pockets of relative stability persist mainly in some eastern states [167].

- **Actors**: While the two main actors are SAF against the RSF, numerous other forces are involved. Ethnic and regional militias have aligned with either side, drawing in myriad local factions and grievances. The conflict is also internationalised, drawing in regional powers and neighbouring countries [168].

- **Intensity of violence**: Fighting has been extraordinarily intense and brutal, with extensive civilian targeting. The death toll is difficult to verify; ACLED figures suggest about 40 000 confirmed deaths but estimates put that number at around 150 000 tens of thousands [169]. The violence spans conventional urban warfare, indiscriminate bombing, and ethnically motivated massacres in Darfur described as genocidal [170].

- **Duration and evolution**: The war is now well into its third year with no end in sight. Mediation efforts by regional and international powers have stalled amid competing foreign interests [171].

Figure 12. Overview of conflict-related factors in Sudan. Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.



Production Date: 11 December2025 Sources: EC-JRC research, ESRI, (19) Thomas van Linge (@ThomasVLinge) / X.

This latest conflict follows decades of instability in the country which since its independence in 1956 has seen two other long civil wars that have led to the secession of South Sudan, the dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir for almost three decades and the genocide in Darfur in 2003 [172].

- **Damage to infrastructure and services**: The war has ravaged Sudan's infrastructure and caused widespread destruction of homes, hospitals, schools and public facilities [173]. Nationwide, nearly three-quarters of health facilities are out of service, fuelling deadly outbreaks of cholera, measles, and malaria [174], [175]. The country's schools have been forced to

shut down leaving over 17 million children out of school [176]. In Khartoum, entire neighbourhoods have been destroyed, and Darfur's towns have been burned down in ethnically targeted violence.

DISPLACEMENT

Almost 30% of the country's population has been displaced by conflict. At the end of 2024, there were 11.6 million people displaced within the country and 2.8 million refugees [177]. Notably, Sudan already had around 3.8 million IDPs before 2023 due to previous conflicts, so the current war has compounded an already dire situation [178].

The following points highlight the main displacement trends:

- **IDPs**: Estimates from September 2025, show a population of about 8 million IDPs, following a decline from the peak of 11.6 million touched in the spring [179]. Displacement is highly concentrated, and many have fled short distances to adjacent states: 60% of displaced people relocating under 200 km from their homes [180]. This reflects primarily the limited means and the high cost of transportation and fuel. surveys have found that having relatives or community ties in a location is a major factor in IDPs' choice of destination inside Sudan Many have been uprooted multiple times as frontlines shift. Humanitarian actors report that many who wish to flee have not been able to leave conflict zones and remain "involuntarily immobilised".
- **Refugees**: Most Sudanese refugees have fled to nearby countries (see figure 13). Chad now hosts over 1.2 million Sudanese, including 844,000 who arrived since April 2023. Most are women and children, as many men stayed behind or were killed [181]. Egypt shelters

Figure 13. Overview of displacement in and around Sudan



about 750,000, largely middle-class families from Khartoum and the north, while roughly 350,000 fled to South Sudan and 790,000 South Sudanese returned home from Sudan [182]. Smaller numbers reached Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and Libya. While not registered as refugees, UN population estimates show the number of migrants from Sudan in Saudi Arabia increasing from 480,000 before the war to 869,000 at the end of 2024 [183]. Those with resources or connections managed to escape or find work abroad, while poorer groups remain trapped or displaced within Sudan. The war has also disrupted long-standing circular migration patterns in the region.

- **Duration of displacement**: Many Sudanese face the prospect of long-term displacement. Some spontaneous IDP returns have occurred in early 2025; however, these returns are fragile and often partial; without a peace settlement, displacement tends to become protracted. Past conflicts in Sudan, resulted in some communities remaining displaced for decades.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Sudan's displacement patterns need to be understood in the broader context of the country's fragility, economic collapse and interacting migration drivers. The fragility indicator on the left captures how these dimensions come together. Each dimension includes composite indicators and the length of the bars in each subgraph represents the severity of fragility for that specific dimension and indicator.

Sudan is categorised by the OECD as a country experiencing extreme fragility, including across economic, human, political, security, and societal dimensions, alongside moderate fragility alongside the environmental dimension. Sudan's IDP and refugee population and historical deaths from war and non-state conflict contribute severely to security fragility. Forced displacement and social exclusion are high to severe risk factors in the societal dimension. Environmental-related displacement contributes highly to environmental fragility [184].

- **Economic collapse and resources**: Years of poor governance and war have left Sudan's economy in ruins, drastically limiting people's resources for survival or migration. Even before 2023, Sudan was a low-income, fragile state with high poverty [185]. During the war, Sudan's GDP has contracted by 40% and extreme poverty has more than doubled, going from 23% to 59% of the population. This economic freefall is both a driver and consequence of displacement [186]. Securing a visa, transport or smugglers is prohibitive for most Sudanese, who often rely on humanitarian aid which is also dwindling.

- **Safety and proximity**: Most people attempt to reach the nearest safe location, whether that is a town in a neighbouring state or just across an international border [187]. This is evident in the heavily localised displacement patterns inside

Figure 14. 14 Sudan's fragility indicators (OECD Fragility Framework). Source: JRC elaboration on OECD Fragility Framework data



Sudan (e.g. people from Khartoum stopping in the first secure region south of the capital). Proximity matters because it lowers the physical, financial and cultural barriers to flight [188]. Border areas between Chad and Darfur are often home to the same ethnic group which shares the same language [189]. Many Sudanese perceive nearby countries as safer temporary havens rather than permanent resettlement destinations; they flee for immediate survival, not necessarily with a long-term migration plan.

- **Legal pathways**: Porous borders with neighbouring countries such as Chad and free movement policies with South Sudan facilitate passage of people feeling war and ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Legally entering Egypt has become however more difficult since 2024, when the country suspended the "Four Freedoms Agreement" that allowed Sudanese people to enter freely and work in the country [190]. Reintroducing visas has made entering the country has made this route accessible only to those able to pay hefty fees or with preexisting connections to the country [191]. Drawing on the preexisting diaspora in Gulf countries, some Sudanese have been able to obtain temporary labour permits in countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE. Non-refoulment is generally respected across the region except for Tunisia and Libya for which pushbacks have been recorded. Sudanese citizens have one of the weakest passports in the world granting them visa free travel to only 13 countries, mostly in the East African region [192]. Western countries have offered very few resettlement or humanitarian visas for Sudanese refugees.

- **Weak institutions and corruption**: Sudan's crisis is underpinned by institutional fragility and governance failure, which both fuel displacement and impede effective response [193]. This fragility creates a security vacuum where civilians have no protection from violence, police and courts are not operating in many areas, leading to lawlessness and predation [194]. Armed actors loot aid, steal public resources and blocking assistance to rival regions. Weak institutions mean basic services such as water, electricity, healthcare or schools are not provided [195],[196]. Attacks on the central banks have also devastated the country's capacity to print money. Fragility also complicates return: even if fighting eases, residents may find nothing to return to in terms of governance or services.

- **Integration and host community support**: Within Sudan, millions of IDPs strain impoverished host communities, driving up rents and food prices while overcrowding and limited aid deepen hardship. Informal networks, local solidarity and family ties have played a crucial role in their survival [197],[198]. In Egypt, refugees live in cities; while this can facilitate integration, they face increasingly tight migration regulations, soaring rents, job competition and xenophobia. In Chad, South Sudan, and Uganda, refugees rely on overstretched camps with severe shortages of water, shelter, schools, and health care [199].

SYRIA

Conflict level: Extreme (2024)
Change category: Consistently concerning (2024)
Number of IDPs: 6.1 million, 25% population (September 2025)
Number of refugees: 5.6 million, 23% population (June 2025)
Population: 24.5 million (2024)
Income level: Low
People below poverty line: estimated 67% of the population; extreme poverty rate 25% of the population (2022)
People facing food insecurity: estimated 12.9 million people (2024).

Sources: ACLED, IOM, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP.

OVERVIEW

Since its beginning in 2011, the Syrian conflict has produced one of the largest forced displacement situations in the world. Fourteen years later, approximately half of the Syrian population remains displaced either internally (6.1 million) or outside of the country (5.6 million). The Syrian conflict has been fuelled by a complex set of political, socio-economic and ethnoreligious factors and by substantial involvement of regional and international actors. In December 2024, a regime change ended five decades of the Assad dynasty rule and opened a period of political transition [200]. By mid-2025, the Syrian Transitional Government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) had established control over key urban centres (Damascus, Homs, Aleppo), while other areas – in the north and northeast – remained under the control of different actors, including Türkiye and Kurdish-led forces.

The impact of the 2023 earthquakes continued to strain housing and infrastructure. Repairs expanded in 2025 but remained uneven and under-funded. Internal displacement dynamics were influenced by the escalation of hostilities in November 2024, with over 1.1 million people - mostly women and children displaced across the country, in particular from northwestern regions of Aleppo, Idleb, and Hama. Refugees remained concentrated in neighbouring countries: Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan, Iraq, with significant numbers in EU countries (notably in Germany). Initiatives to facilitate returns intensified after the transition, but large-scale, sustainable returns have not materialized yet due to persisting insecurity and limited recovery of basic services in Syria.

CONFLICT

The origins of the Syrian conflict can be traced back to early 2011 when massive protests against the Assad regime broke out in major Syrian cities, inspired by a wave of pro-democracy uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. By September 2011, following a heavy crackdown by the regime, organized rebel militias were regularly engaging in combat with government troops in different areas of the country [201]. The evolution of the conflict over the last fourteen years has been shaped by a geopolitical and military dynamics. Some of the key events shaping the conflict include:

a) the internationalization of the conflict and the involvement of regional and international powers providing diplomatic, financial and military support to the Syrian government (Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah in Lebanon) or opposition forces (Türkiye, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, US, France, United Kingdom);

b) the emergence and demise of Islamic State/ Daesh, which at its height in 2014 controlled around a third of Syria territory;

Figure 15. Overview of conflict in Syria. Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.



c) a direct involvement in the conflict by Russian forces since 2015, with the deployment of Russian ground troops and aerial attacks against opposition forces (such as the Free Syrian Army) and the Islamic State;

d) the consolidation of a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria, with Kurdish forces conducting successful military campaigns against Daesh fighters in the region;

e) in August 2016, a military intervention by Turkish forces in northern Syria, targeting Islamic State and Kurdish forces, leading to the occupation of parts of northern Syria;

f) in November 2024, the demise the former president Bashar al-Assad by opposition forces led by Islamist rebel group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army, marking the start of a process of political transition [202].

Key conflict dynamics described below focus on the most recent events occurred since the fall of the Assad regime in November 2024:

- **Geography and patterns of violence:** In 2025, fighting decreased around major urban centres controlled by the transitional government, but recurrent escalations of violence persisted in several regions: clashes between pro-government militias and Assad loyalists in the northwestern provinces of Hama, Tartous, Lattakia and Homs; confrontation between government forces and Kurdish-led forces in areas around Aleppo and Ar Raqqa; clashes and shelling incidents in al-Saweyda governorate involving Druze factions, regime forces and Sunni Bedouin tribal militias [203].

- **Actors and capabilities**: In the first part of 2025, transitional government forces, Kurdish forces, ethnic local militias, and ISIS cells coexist alongside foreign military presences (notably Türkiye, Israel, Iran-linked groups, and residual Russian units). The transitional government has expanded its administrative reach over large parts of the country, including key urban centres, but other areas – particularly in the north and northeast – remain under the control of other actors, including Türkiye and Kurdish-led forces [204]. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel has pursued a broader strategy to enforce the demilitarization of southern Syria and prevent the reactivation of Syrian and allied forces' military capabilities near the Golan Heights. To that aim, Israel has deployed ground forces into the UN-patrolled buffer zone, establishing nine permanent outposts and expanding its presence beyond the buffer area into Daraa and Quneitra [205].

- **Intensity and civilian impact**: Compared with 2024, in 2025 the intensity of conflict decreased, but spikes in civilian casualties occurred during periodic escalations – particularly near contested frontlines in Idleb, Aleppo, Al Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor. Clashes between pro-government forces and Druze factions in as-Suwayda Governorate resulted in high number of casualties and mass displacement [206]. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) contamination and sporadic attacks continued to pose severe risks to civilians [207].

- **Damage to infrastructure and services**: The conflict in Syria is estimated to have damaged one third of the country's Gross Capital Stock (GCS) causing a total physical damage to infrastructure and building of USD 108 billion [208]. In 2025, repairs to electricity, water, and social services advanced in some urban areas, but continuing strikes and widespread funding gaps hindered progress [209]. Many facilities damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes remain only partially repaired, and basic services in affected areas are often intermittent [210]. This circumstance undermines service continuity and constitutes a key barrier to safe and sustainable returns [211].

DISPLACEMENT

- **IDP dynamics**: As of June 2025, IOM identified about 6.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) across assessed communities in Syria, with children representing 55 per cent of this population. The largest share of the IDP population is hosted in Rural Damascus (32%), followed by Idleb (22%) and Aleppo (18%) [212]. The largest number of IDPs displaced over 2025 (January- September) can be attributed to the major escalation in hostilities that began in 13 July 2025 in as-Suwayda Governorate, leading to a collapse of essential services, widespread displacement, and the closure of access routes. Key factors shaping IDPs movements within Syria include poor economic situation (30%), lack of shelter (24%) and security concerns (16%) [213].

- **Refugees and cross-border dynamics**: About 6.1. million Syrians remained registered as refugees and asylum-seekers with the UNHCR at the end of 2024, primarily in countries within the region: Türkiye (2,9 million), Lebanon (755 000), and Jordan (611 000), with significant populations in Iraq (304 000), and Egypt (120 500). These figures reflect officially registered refugees; actual numbers are considerably higher. In Lebanon, for example, government instructed UNHCR to suspend refugee registrations in 2015 and estimates today approximate 1.4 million Syrian refugees. Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, and particularly in the period 2015-2016, more than one million Syrian refugees have arrived in Europe, mostly in Germany (695 000), Austria (101 000), the Netherlands (66 000) and France (46 000) [214]. However, due to increasing returns during the first half of 2025, UNHCR reports that at mid-2025 Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers globally declined to 5.6 million [215].

Figure 16. Internally Displaced Persons by Governorate (June 2025). Source: JRC elaboration on IOM and IDMC data



- **Returns**. As of June 2025, IOM estimates that since December 2024, a total of 1.8 million internally displaced persons had returned to their areas of origin, while 1 million people returned to Syria from abroad. The main destinations of return include Damascus, Aleppo, Idleb, Homs and Rural Damascus[7]. Returns remain fragile, constrained by security concerns, damaged housing, lack of financial resources, and inadequate access to basic services [216]. Despite significant returns, new internal and cross-border displacement is happening concurrently following localised outbreaks of violence.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Syria is categorised by the OECD as experiencing **extreme overall fragility** (the highest classification), showing severe fragility across five dimensions - economic, human, political, security and societal - alongside high fragility in the environmental dimension. Syria's IDP and refugee population and historical deaths from war and non-state conflict all comprise severe risks with regard to security fragility. Forced displacement and social exclusion contribute severely to societal fragility. Environmental-related displacement contributes severely to the environmental dimension [217]. Each dimension includes composite indicators and the length of the bars in each subgraph represents

7 According to IOM, 'arrivals from abroad' include Individuals who had been living in other countries - regardless of their status in the host countries - and have now returned to Syria with the intention to stay, either in their place of origin or another location within the country. OM (2025). Syrian Arab Republic. Population Mobility and Baseline Assessment. Round 5 June 2025. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/syrian-arab-republic-population-mobility-and-baseline-assessment-round-5-01-30-june-2025?close=true

Figure 17. Total Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries (2024). Source: UNHCR. Source: JRC elaboration on UNHCR data



Note: in text regarding undercounts due to incompleteness of UNHCR statistics in countrie, such as Lebanon and Jordan.

the severity of fragility for that specific dimension and indicator.

- **Economy and livelihoods**: The conflict has had a severe impact on the Syrian economy, with real gross domestic product (GDP) declining by approximately 53 percent between 2010 and 2022 [218]. Following a contraction of 1.5% in 2024, Syria's GDP is expected to grow modestly by 1% in 2025, amid continued security challenges, liquidity constraints, and suspended foreign assistance [219]. The OECD multidimensional fragility framework indicates that Syria is experiencing severe fragility in the economic dimension for indicators such as general government gross debt, unemployment rate, current account deficit and exchange rate volatility [220]. Agriculture – the main source of livelihood for half of the Syrian population – has been devastated by the destruction of critical infrastructure, widespread displacement and limited access to inputs and extension services. Against this already dire backdrop, the Syrian Arab Republic is now experiencing its most severe drought in 36 years. From November 2024 to April 2025, rainfall was 54 percent below average, with some areas facing deficits of up to 69 percent [221].

- **Service degradation**: After fourteen years of conflict, access to water has become one of the most prominent humanitarian challenges in Syria, which is exacerbated by climate change. The water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector estimates that nearly 10 million people are already struggling to meet their basic water needs, heightening public health risks, and potentially worsening the malnutrition situation, as well as protection concerns [222].

- **Governance and political instability**: Following the December 2024 political transition, transitional government expanded administrative

Figure 18. Syria's fragility indicators (OECD Fragility Framework). Source: JRC elaboration on OECD Fragility Framework data



reach over a large share of the country's territory, but its control remains uneven nationwide. International actors continue to emphasize support for a Syrian-led process but long-standing institutional weaknesses and acute fiscal pressures pose substantial constraints on stabilization and reconstruction efforts [223].

- **Humanitarian access and funding**: OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) records that Syria Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2024 was severely underfunded, with only 36.6 per cent of the USD 4.1 billion total requirements covered. In addition, the Humanitarian Response Priorities document covering January to June 2025 remained only 15.9 per cent funded, leaving USD 1.68 billion of funding requirements unmet [224]. Reduced assistance coverage implies that there is limited capacity to provide newly displaced people with basic shelter, protection assistance and life-saving items. In parallel, cuts are likely to impact on returns, undermining host countries' commitments to sustainable and voluntary returns and hampering the reconstruction of vital infrastructures and scaling up of public services in Syria [225].

- **Host-country protection regimes**: In 2025, difficulties in accessing work permits and livelihood opportunities, limited freedom of movement, fear of detention influenced the condition of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries. In Türkiye, barriers to accessing temporary protection for Syrians remained a significant challenge, along with deactivations of existing permits. In addition, significant funding cuts to international assistance programmes resulted in many NGOs supporting refugees having to scale down their operations, reducing service provisions for refugees [226]. In Lebanon, nine out of ten refugee households live in extreme poverty, facing hyperinflation, subsidy removals and socio-economic deterioration [227]. In Jordan some 620 000 people are registered as refugees with UNHCR. While the government has made efforts to ensure refugee participation in national social systems (including healthcare, education and the labour market), poverty rates among refugees have increased and unemployment remains high, while cash and food aid cuts are straining coping mechanisms [228].

UKRAINE

Conflict level: High (2024)
Change category: Consistently concerning (2024)
Number of IDPs: 3.3 million, 8.6% population (June 2025)
Number of refugees from Ukraine: 5.3 million, 14% population (June 2025)
Population: 38 million (2024)
Income level: Upper-middle income (2024)
Below poverty line: 37 % (2025), up sharply from 5.5 % pre-war (2021).

Sources: ACLED, IOM, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP

OVERVIEW

As of June 2025, 3.3 million people were internally displaced within Ukraine and 5.3 million lived as refugees abroad. Recurrent damage to power and heating systems exposes households to winter-related risks that continue to shape mobility and return decisions. Displacement in Ukraine reflects the combined effects of high-intensity warfare, recurrent strikes on energy and housing infrastructure, and constrained mobility and return options due to insecurity and depleted resources. Civilian vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs remain acute, particularly in frontline areas where access to humanitarian aid is limited. The EU Temporary Protection regime, extended until March 2027, continues to provide legal residence and access to services for around 4.2 million Ukrainians across Europe, though prospects for durable solutions - either sustainable return in Ukraine or long-term integration in hosting countries - remain uncertain.

CONFLICT

Russia's full-scale invasion entered its fourth year in 2025. The conflict began on 24 February 2022 when Russian forces started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, there had already been eight years of conflict in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian government forces and Russian separatists alongside Russian forces over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions [229].

In early 2022, the action of Russian forces was directed at seizing Ukraine Capital Kyiv; however, short after, the conflict shifted to Ukraine's eastern and southern regions (in particular Sumy, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporiyzhzhya, Kherson oblasts). The evolution of the conflict has been marked by countervailing dynamics; following a stalled Russian advance, in August-September 2022 and June 2023 Ukraine started counteroffensives to retake territory in the Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; however, the latest Ukraine's advance had reached a stalemate by November 2023. In turn, 2024 saw renewed Russian offensives, including in the Kharkiv and Donetsk regions [230].

Against this backdrop, in 2025 the military landscape remained volatile. Russian military operations continued with steady but slow territorial gains along the northeast (Kharkiv oblast) and the eastern and southern axes (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson). Missile and drone attacks continued to affect regions across Ukraine, including major urban centres far from the frontlines. At the time of writing, the security situation is characterized by ongoing hostilities and no indication of de-escalation along the main eastern and southern fronts. Active combat and long-range attacks continue, and international monitoring sources report no significant change in the overall intensity of conflict [231].

Key characteristics of the conflict in 2025:

- **Actors**: The conflict involves the Armed Forces of Ukraine and affiliated territorial defence units opposing Russian regular and proxy forces. Ukraine's international partners (most notably the U.S, EU Member States and the UK) continue to

Figure 19. Ukraine situation map. Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.

provide support, including through assistance for the repair and protection of energy infrastructure and critical utilities [232].

- **Geographic diffusion**: Over the summer of 2025, Russian forces made significant gains in the Donetsk oblast, capturing the town of Chasiv Yar and opening the ground for potential further advances to Kramatorsk or Kostyantynivka. Still in the Donetsk region, Russian forces reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk, putting the city under siege [233]. Missile and drone strikes continued to affect multiple regions across Ukraine, while sustained ground combat remains concentrated in the eastern and southern oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson). Major urban centres far from the frontline – such as Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, and Odesa – have repeatedly experienced attacks on critical energy infrastructure and residential areas [234].

- **Intensity of violence**: ACLED data show persistently high levels of civilian harm from shelling, missile, and drone strikes. Civilian casualties remain elevated, particularly in frontline oblasts and major urban centres affected by repeated infrastructure attacks [235].

- **Damage to infrastructure and services**: Recurrent strikes have severely damaged Ukraine's power, heating, and water systems. The World Bank estimates USD 176 billion in total war damage by the end of 2024, including USD 20.5 billion in the energy sector [236]. Over 3,100 power-system disruptions were recorded between March and September 2025. Major thermal-plant attacks in September-October left up to 800 000 people without electricity [237]. The 2025-2026 Cold Spot Risk Assessment identified as the areas most affected by cold those in northern and eastern Ukraine along the frontline and northern border (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donestk). Residents face harsh winter conditions compounded by high vulnerability and severely damaged infrastructure from ongoing conflict and airstrikes [238].

DISPLACEMENT

The Ukraine conflict had an immediate and large-scale impact on displacement both internal and cross border. Already at the end of March 2022, five weeks since the beginning of the Russian invasion, a quarter of the population of Ukraine (around ten million people) had been forcibly displaced, with more than 4 million refugees outside of the country Ukraine and a further 6.5 million people internally displaced [239].

Three years later, mid-2025, displacement remained extensive. According to IOM, about 3.7 million people were internally displaced, reflecting new displacements caused by strikes on energy and urban infrastructure and ongoing returns to partially repaired areas [240]. Cross-border displacement had stabilised at a persistently high level, with 5.7 million refugees and asylum-seekers from Ukraine worldwide – most hosted in EU Member States under the temporary protection framework [241].

Main displacement trends:

- **IDPs**: According to IOM, there were 3.3 million internally displaced persons registered in Ukraine as of June 2025. The largest numbers were residing in frontline oblasts such as Dnipropetrovska and Kharkivska. However, significant numbers were also recorded in oblast afield from the frontline, such as Kyiv City and Lvivska[8]. According to a survey published by IOM in October 2025, the majority of IDPs (88%) plan to remain in their current locations in the short term, and 71% intend to stay beyond three months. However, only 49% plan to settle and

Figure 20. Estimated de facto IDPs presence in Ukraine by oblast of displacement (June 2025). Source: JRC elaboration on IOM data

8 According to IOM definition, the total number of registered IDPs reflects the number of IDPs registered after February 2022 who hold a valid IDP registration status as of the end of the reporting period. IOM (2025). Registered IDPs dashboard. https://dtm.iom.int/online-interactive-resources/registered-idp-dashboard

Figure 21. Refugees from Ukraine across Europe 2024. Source: JRC elaboration on UNHCR data



integrate locally, while many remain uncertain about their future [242].

- **Refugees**: UNHCR reports 5.1 million refugees and asylum-seekers from Ukraine worldwide at the end of 2024, with numbers showing only a slight increase over the first part of 2025. The vast majority of refugees is hosted in Europe, mostly in Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, and Italy, with significant numbers in non-EU countries such as the US, Canada and the UK [243]. Assistance and integration supports vary across hosting states, reflecting differences in legal and policy frameworks, welfare systems and labour-market conditions [244].

- **Returns**: As of October 2025, IOM estimated 4.43 million returnees in Ukraine[9]. Nearly half of them (47%) had returned from another oblast, while one in four had returned from abroad (26%). Returns from abroad were mostly from EU countries, notably Poland, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic. Most returnees are concentrated in Kyiv City, Kharkivska, and Kyivska oblasts. The main barrier to return remains safety and security concerns. Overall, returns are fragile and often reversible without sustained improvements in security, livelihoods, and access to basic services [245].

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

- **Household resources and livelihoods**: In 2025, wartime income losses and inflation continue to constrain mobility and return options.

9 Returnees are defined by IOM as individuals who have returned to their habitual residences after a period of displacement of a minimum of two weeks since February 2022, whether from abroad or from internal displacement within Ukraine. IOM (2025). Ukraine Returns Report General Population Survey. Round 21 October 2025. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-general-population-survey-round-21-october-2025?close=true

The World Bank reports that real household incomes remain well below pre-war levels, while living costs – especially housing and utilities – have risen in major urban areas undergoing reconstruction. Even where security has improved, limited savings and high rental prices deter many displaced families from returning to damaged cities [246]. A large share of IDPs rely on humanitarian assistance or irregular earnings to meet basic needs [247]. In European host countries, access to employment, schooling and social support under the Temporary Protection Directive has played a key role in supporting the integration of refugees into the receiving societies [248].

- **Energy infrastructure**: As Ukraine enters its fourth winter of the war, energy facilities remain a central target of Russian attacks. Recurrent strikes continue to damage power plants, heating networks, and gas infrastructure, posing major challenges to system stability. As an example, the IEA recorded over 3,100 power-sector disruptions across six regions in the period March – September 2025. In September 2025, Russia launched its largest air assault since the invasion, severely damaging the rebuilt Trypilska Thermal Power Plant. A further attack in October caused extensive damage to thermal plants in Kyiv, leaving about 800 000 residents without electricity [249].
- **Legal pathways and temporary protection**: The EU's Temporary Protection directive – currently extended until March 2027 – continues to provide legal residence, access to services, and labour-market participation for around 4.2 million Ukrainian refugees across EU Member States [250]. The latest extension has reduced uncertainty and prevented large-scale status expirations. At the same time, differences in national implementation persist, particularly regarding employment support, housing assistance, and social benefits [251]. Ongoing EU-level discussions focus on a transition framework to facilitate switching to other residence statuses (e.g. work permits), and support voluntary and gradual return to Ukraine [252].

VENEZUELA

Conflict level: High
Change category: Worsening
Number of IDPs: 2 300 (disaster-related); 600 000 (displaced, stateless or returning from forced displacement)[10]
Number of refugees from Venezuela: 7.6 million, 27% of population
Population: 28 million
Income level: lower-middle income[11]
Below extreme poverty line: 14.3 million, 51% of population[12]
People facing hunger: 11.4 million, 40% of population [253].

Sources: ACLED, IDMC, UNHCR, UNDESA, World Bank and WFP. All the data in the table are for 2024.

OVERVIEW

Venezuela faces a complex crisis characterised by state repression, violence against civilians, battles between government forces and criminal/armed groups and protests over deteriorating economic conditions and governance. These dynamics have compelled nearly eight million Venezuelans to flee since 2014, mostly to neighbouring countries like Colombia, where migration pressures and humanitarian needs remain high. Displacement is driven by intersecting factors, such as a breakdown of law, militarisation, shortages of food and medicine and deteriorating public services.

CONFLICT

Not a conventional civil war, Venezuela is marred by an economic crisis overlayered with political authoritarianism, state violence, organised crime, and armed group activity. The situation intensified under President Nicolás Maduro, following the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, with economic crisis, high levels of corruption, and repression converging to produce large scale displacement.

Following are key characteristics of the situation in relation to violence, unrest, and fragility:

- **Political repression and state violence**: Since the July 2024 presidential election, state repression has escalated. Security forces and pro-government armed groups, such as colectivos, engage in arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture of detainees and killings of protesters and perceived opposition figures. Based on the hundreds of politically motivated arrests and political prisoners and dozens of verified cases of torture and sexual abuse, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela has concluded that Venezuelan state policy amounts to crimes against humanity [254].

- **Organised criminal violence and armed non-state groups**: Armed groups - such as prison gangs, large criminal groups, gangs connected to powerful labour unions, paramilitary groups, and dissidents - have consolidated varying

10 Due to inconsistent data availability, numbers on IDPs are lacking or contain variations across sources. This is the number of people displaced or stateless (or returning from forced displacement) within the country at the end of 2024, as per the UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/venezuela-bolivarian-republic

11 Currently, the World Bank has not classified Venezuela. It last classified Venezuela as an upper-middle income country in 2022. However, due to lack of reliable official data, it used outdated GNI figures from 2013. Maldonado and Olivo employ various estimation methods to conclude that Venezuela should be reclassified as lower-middle income from 2018 onwards; https://publications.iadb.org/en/publications/english/viewer/Is-Venezuela-Still-an-Upper-Middle-Income-Country-Estimating-the-GNI-per-Capita-for-2015–2021.pdf

12 Due to lack of alternate data, figure indicates population under extreme poverty and comes from the 2013 Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI).

Figure 22. Map of violent events over past year (ACLED-recorded battles and explosions/remote violence). Source: JRC elaboration on ACLED data and OSINT.



degrees of control over parts of Venezuela, especially in border and mining regions where state authority is weak, and at times collaborates with or tolerates these groups. These include the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) dissidents and the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), which have increasingly operated in Venezuelan border areas following the 2016 Colombia peace accord, fragmented into multiple splinter factions competing for territorial and resource control. Human Rights Watch reports that violence linked to illegal mining activities by these actors has displaced Indigenous communities in the south [255]. The International Crisis Group has documented how mining mafias, paramilitaries, and state forces violently compete over gold and coltan [256]. Government intervention in illegal mining regions has reportedly served to rearrange hierarchies of control, rather than eradicate activity, leading to further environmental degradation [257].

- **Geographic diffusion**: Violence and armed group activity linked to illegal mining has concentrated in border regions and illegal mining areas in the south, where the state and armed groups collaborate and compete at the same time [258]. Instead, urban areas in the north experience high degrees of demonstrations and state repression [259].

- **Damage to environment, infrastructure, and services**: State raids of numerous illegal gold mines - ostensibly in the name of environmental protection - have actually led to further environmental exploitation. This either occurs through direct state exploitation for profit or by allowing intermediary armed groups to take cuts from the mining activities through taxation, bribes, or preferential treatment. Venezuela is home to 30% of illegal mining sites in the Amazon basin, in 2023 hosting 140 000 hectares [260]. Deforestation, toxic chemical use, and wildlife habitat loss have led to systematic ecosystem destruction. Indigenous communities

Figure 23. Refugees and other people of concern to UNHCR, UNHCR 2024; per country, when >=5 000. In the case of Venezuela, almost none are categorised as "refugees," but rather as "Others in need of international protection." Source: JRC elaboration on R4V platform merging data from UNHCR, UNDESA and national agencies.



have had to abandon tradition agriculture for mining, with hundreds of thousands working in exploitative labour conditions under armed control [261]. Unreliable access to water and electricity due to damage to water supplies and mismanagement of power grids continue to drive everyday insecurity [262].

DISPLACEMENT

The Venezuelan exodus began in 2014, following government economic mismanagement, inflation, and food, water, and basic good shortages. Those living in poverty and at risk of starvation spiked [263]. Over time, displacement was driven by a nexus of economic, safety, and political concerns [264]. The following points highlight the main displacement trends:

- **IDPs**: There is sparse and inconsistent data on internal displacement in Venezuela largely due to government censorship of many official national statistics. UNHCR reports it is assisting more than 611 000 people displaced or stateless or returning from forced displacement within the country at the end of 2024 [265]. Human Rights Watch reports that illegal mining regularly displaces indigenous communities [266]. Disaster-related movements have been reported, such as 60 000 displaced people during 2022 floods [267]. The IDMC reported around 2 300 IDPs as of 2024 and nearly 3 000 internal displacements that same year, mostly due to houses destroyed as a result of floods and a hurricane in August-November 2024 [268]. In June 2025, 10 000 families were affected by a storm and subsequent flash floods, with unclear displacement estimates [269].

- **Refugees**: With over 7 million people or more than a quarter of the country's population displaced abroad, Venezuela remains one of the most significant global displacement crises. The majority (6.5 million) of Venezuelan refugees are in Latin America and the Caribbean [270]. Nearly 90% of them are hosted in Colombia (3 million), Peru, the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. Out of those, only just under 400 000 are formally recognised as refugees, while the rest is classified by the UNHCR as "Others in need of international protection." This is because most

states in the region have opted for alternative legal pathways in lieu of refugee recognition. Colombia, for example, uses special residence permits that regularise the status of Venezuelans for a temporary period while granting access to employment, health, and education. In the first half of 2025, Venezuelans became the largest group of asylum seekers to the EU - with just under 50 000 first time asylum applications -, after a decade of Syrians occupying that position.

- **Duration of displacement:** Venezuelan displacement has proven to be protracted, with most refugees and migrants remaining outside of the country without clear prospects for return. The vast majority of those living abroad have been there for years, primarily in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. This reflects enduring factors, such as economic collapse, state repression, and breakdown of essential services, which constrain conditions for safe and voluntary return. Early emigration consisted mostly of professionals and the upper class but expanded to wider sectors of society from 2014-2015 onwards due to hyperinflation [271].

- **Mixed migration drivers**: Most Venezuelan migrants and refugees report multiple reasons for migrating, combining economic reasons with violence and insecurity, lack of services and corruption, and restricted rights and freedoms [272].

- **Modes of moving**: How Venezuelans travelled varied depending on geographic proximity to their intended destination and socioeconomic status. Nearly all of those who arrive to Colombia do so by public transport, with just under 10% arriving by foot [273]. Those who walk - the *caminantes* - often face significant protection concerns, and their numbers are linked to the fuel crisis which affects the availability of motorised transport. Their vulnerability is linked to exposure to threats, such as extortion or abuse along the way and difficult access to necessities and shelter [274.

- **Families on the move**: A large share of Venezuelan migrants and refugees left as family units [275]. At the same time, 2018-2020 UNHCR data indicates high levels of household fragmentation: nearly 43% of those who migrated from Venezuela left behind families, and 10% left or were left behind in third countries along the way [276].

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Venezuela's crisis is driven by the convergence of structural economic collapse, the breakdown of public services, and the intensification of repression and violence. Much of this is linked to years of state neglect and hyperinflation that undermined access to health, food, and water all the while extrajudicial violence persisted [277]. Each dimension includes composite indicators and the length of the bars in each subgraph represents the severity of fragility for that specific dimension and indicator.

The OECD classifies Venezuela as a country experiencing **high overall fragility**, and severe

Figure 24. Venezuela's fragility indicators (OECD Fragility Framework). Source: JRC elaboration on OECD Fragility Framework data



fragility in the political dimension (with high corruption, restricted political rights, and weak executive constraints), high fragility in economic, security, and societal dimensions, and moderate fragility in environmental and human dimensions. Venezuela's security fragility context is rooted in severe risks related to the country's refugee and IDP population and historical deaths from non-state conflict. Fragility along the societal dimension is highly rooted in exclusion by social group [278].

- **Economic collapse**: According to the IMF, consumer inflation is projected to increase by 270% in 2025, to among the highest worldwide [279]. After GDP declined by nearly 80% between 2013 and 2021, 2022 saw three consecutive years of growth. However, heavy reliance on oil and the impact of U.S. sanctions mean that the economy will contract again in 2025 and 2026 - even if state and independent sources show a somewhat conflicting picture [280].

- **Integration in host countries**: Venezuelans are more likely to be employed in the countries they settle in compared to their hosts - except for in Colombia where the difference is minimal. The majority report an intention to stay where they are, particularly those in Colombia and Chile. Though discrimination persists, shared language and, to some extent, culture provide opportunities for integration, with the help of existing communication programmes and interventions aimed at addressing attitudes toward migrants in host countries [281]. Regularised status is an important tool for addressing employment and access to services even if many Venezuelans remain in informal situations [282].

- **Social protection and essential services:** Over 20 million Venezuelans, or more than two-thirds of the population, are living in multidimensions poverty due to economic precarity and poor public services [283]. With formal employment at less than half of all employment, most workers lack adequate social protection [284]. Frequent electrical outages, lack of running water, and overall deteriorated infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, has been pushing people to urban centres [285].

- **Foreign relations landscape**: Tensions have been escalating following the disputed July 2024 presidential election, which the United States refused to recognise. The U.S. administration designated Maduro's government as a terrorist organisation in November 2025 and has deployed military forces to the Caribbean with threats of imminent ground operations against alleged drug trafficking networks - though analysts and regional leaders highlight talks on accessing Venezuelan oil resources.

BOX 9. Colombia

Once a single nation, Venezuela and Colombia's histories and present are tightly interwoven. The current Venezuelan crisis has led to millions migrating into Colombia. The mass exodus of nearly 8 million Venezuelans has placed Colombia at the forefront as the largest host country in Latin America. At the same time, the border regions and transit routes between Venezuela and Colombia are enmeshed in armed conflict and criminal group control, simultaneously driving migration and creating protection risks for those on the move [286]. Colombia is seeing an extreme resurgence of armed violence, as rival non-state armed groups compete for territorial and economic control of strategic border regions. In 2025, the highest number of clashes between state and non-state actors in years were recorded in Colombia. The number of internally displaced people spiked to 7.3 million or 14% of the population after years of relative stability, with Colombia now one of the largest displacement crises. Refugees from Colombia amount to nearly half a million. These developments reflect the fragility of post-2016 peace agreements, with the state unable to exercise sufficient protection capacities in many areas [287]. 13 million people - or one fourth of the population - are food insecure, according to WFP.

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